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Abstract
Statistical disclosure control is a progressive subject which offers techniques with 
which tables of data intended for public release can be protected from the threat of 
disclosure. In this sense disclosure will usually mean information on an individual 
subject being revealed by the release of a table. The techniques used centre around 
detecting potential disclosure in a table and then removing this disclosure by 
somehow adjusting the original table.
This thesis has been produced in conjunction with Information and Services Division 
(Scotland) (ISD) and therefore will concentrate on the applications of statistical 
disclosure control in the field of healthcare with particular reference to the problems 
encountered by ISD. The thesis predominately aims to give an overview of current 
statistical disclosure control techniques. It will investigate how these techniques 
would work in the ISD scenario and will ultimately aim to provide ISD with advice 
on how they should proceed in any future update of their statistical disclosure control 
policy.
Chapter 1 introduces statistical disclosure and investigates some of the legal and 
social issues associated with the field. It also provides information on the techniques 
which are used by other organisations worldwide. Further there is an introduction to 
both the ISD scenario and a leading computing package in the area, Tau-Argus.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the techniques currently used in statistical disclosure 
control. This overview includes technical justification for the techniques along with
the advantages and disadvantages associated with using each technique. Chapter 3 
provides a decision rule approach to the selection of disclosure control techniques 
described in Chapter 2 and much of Chapter 3 revolves around a description of the 
implications derived from the choices made.
Chapter 4 presents the results from an application of statistical disclosure control 
techniques to a real ISD data set concerned with diabetes in children in Scotland. The 
results include a quantification of the information lost in the table when the disclosure 
control technique is applied. The investigation concentrated on two and three- 
dimensional tables and the analysis was carried out using the Tau-Argus computing 
package.
Chapter 5 concludes by providing a summary of the main findings of the thesis and 
providing recommendations based on these findings. There is also a discussion of 
potential further study which may be useful to ISD as they attempt to update their 
statistical disclosure control policy.
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1. Issues in Statistical Disclosure Control
1.1 Need for Statistical Disclosure Control
In any Statistical survey the aim of the statistician is to provide information on a set of 
subjects to the general public. These subjects can range from individuals or 
households to businesses or organisations. What is common to all these subjects is 
that the information they supply should be provided in confidence. Any respectable 
data collector will keep all individual records confidential and this confidence is often 
essential to the quality of the data provided since such a promise should encourage 
participants to not only cooperate fully with the statistician but to provide accurate 
data. The concealment of data from potential intruders is the sole responsibility of the 
statistician and the statistical organisation they work for. This concealment has 
become much more difficult as both statistical methodology and computing 
technology have advanced. Statistical organisations need more detailed data to be 
released to carry out more recent and sophisticated techniques in certain areas such as 
modem advanced modelling techniques. For these data to be released the statistical 
organisations must have in place systems to protect each individual subject’s data.
The huge strides taken in computing technology, in particular the exponential increase 
in size of the World Wide Web, has also ensured that there are vast amounts of 
auxiliary data available to potential intruders.
It may be hard to believe that intmders to statistical studies exist and that they will go 
to great lengths to discover information on a subject but there are situations where it 
may be of great benefit to an organisation to gather sensitive data on individuals.
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Take for example a study on annual turnover of businesses; it may be very helpful for 
a company preparing a potential takeover of a company to know the exact (or at least 
a good estimate of) turnover for that company. In the field of health care there are 
potential difficulties if for example life insurance companies could uncover 
information on individuals from statistical studies and alter their premiums 
accordingly. There is an on going argument between statisticians and in fact 
politicians as to what extent a statistical organisation should be expected to 
compensate for an intruder who is armed with masses of auxiliary data and whether 
information uncovered by such an intruder is indeed a breach of confidentiality. 
Nevertheless the issue of concealment of an individual’s data is clearly important and 
there are in fact laws (to be discussed in section 1.2) governing the processing and 
dissemination of results from studies.
Another interesting point of discussion is what actually constitutes a potential 
disclosure risk. A glossary presented at the Joint ECE/EUROSTAT Work Session on 
Statistical Data Confidentiality [1] defines the following forms of disclosure:
‘Disclosure: This relates to an inappropriate attribution of information to a data 
subject, whether an individual or an organisation.
Disclosure by matching: Disclosure can be accomplished with high resolution keys 
by matching the data set with a register which contains the keys and names and 
addresses.
2
Disclosure by response knowledge: This is the knowledge that a person was 
interviewed for a particular survey; if an investigator knows that a specific individual 
has participated in the survey, and that consequently his or her data are in the data set, 
identification and disclosure can be accomplished more easily.
Disclosure by spontaneous recognition: This means the recognition of rare persons; 
disclosure may occur by accident/
Clearly there are many forms of potential disclosure. Each form of disclosure must be 
considered when thinking about how to protect an individual’s data. There are 
certainly many issues to consider when defining what constitutes disclosure. For 
example there could be occasions where an outside intruder cannot discover 
information about an individual from a table but one subject in the table can discover 
the information about another subject they know is in the same table. It could be 
argued that it is difficult for the statistical organisation to protect against disclosure to 
another individual and that doing so would be too restrictive so protecting only 
against disclosure from an outside intruder is sufficient. On the other hand, many 
members of a study would not want it to be possible for another member in the study 
to infer further information about them so the statistical organisation should protect 
against this form of disclosure as well. It is generally accepted however that when 
there is any doubt, the statistical organisation should always lean towards over 
protection rather than under protection. In fact Dalenius (1978) explains statistical 
disclosure by saying ‘statistical disclosure occurs when the release of a data product 
enables a third party to leam more about a respondent than originally known.’ This 
would seem to imply that if any person (fellow subject or intruder) can infer extra
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information on an individual due to the release of a table then this constitutes an 
unacceptable disclosure of this individual’s personal data.
In response to these issues statisticians have been forced to discover various 
techniques to provide protection of the confidentiality rights of subjects. The blanket 
term for these techniques is statistical disclosure control. Statistical disclosure control 
is basically the issue of balancing the need to know for the greater good of society and 
the right to privacy of the subject. There are many issues in the process of statistical 
disclosure control. The Government Statistical Service Report of the Task Force on 
Disclosure [2] defines the process in this way;
‘There are four processes in the reduction of disclosure risk, namely:
(i) the recognition of risk of disclosure from tables
(ii) the assessment of the degree of risk involved
(iii) the selection of an appropriate method to eliminate or, at least, reduce the 
risk of disclosure of tables
(iv) the quantification of any loss of information.’
1.2 History and Legal Aspects of Statistical Disclosure Control
Although statistical disclosure control has only become a serious concern in the last 
20 years due to the increased power of computers and wide access to data due to the 
World Wide Web the issue dates back to the middle of the 20th century. A study of 
various forms of legislation by Scherff [3] in 1952 implies that a lack of 
confidentiality would result in distrust from respondents and therefore inaccurate data
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would be provided if any data were provided at all. These arguments are very similar 
to those used today.
It was in the 1970’s that the Western world first saw how the power of modem 
technology could affect the privacy of individuals. The web of political scandal in the 
USA from 1972 to 1974 known as the Watergate scandals showed the possibility for 
the authorities to intmde in the lives of individuals to discover a large amount of 
sensitive information. This coupled with increased knowledge of CIA and FBI 
surveillance and exponential growth of information technology resulted in the Privacy 
Act of 1974 [4]. The Privacy Act states: ‘The purpose of this act is to provide certain 
safeguards for an individual against invasion of personal privacy by requiring Federal
agencies to collect, maintain, use or disseminate any record of identifiable
personal information in a manner that assures that such action is for necessary and 
lawful purpose, that the information is current and accurate for its intended use, and 
that adequate safeguards are provided to prevent misuse of such information.’ In 
1980 Europe produced its own cross border regulations for the protection of data.
This was found in the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data [5] produced in 1980 which stated: ‘The development of 
automatic data processing, which enables vast quantities of data to be transmitted 
within seconds across national frontiers, and indeed across continents, has made it 
necessary to consider privacy protection in relation to personal data. Privacy 
protection laws have been introduced, or will be introduced shortly, in approximately 
one half of OECD Member countries (Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the United States have passed legislation. 
Belgium, Iceland, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland have prepared draft bills) to
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prevent what are considered to be violations of fundamental human rights, such as the 
unlawful storage of personal data, the storage of inaccurate personal data, or the abuse
or unauthorised disclosure of such data OECD Member countries considered it
necessary to develop Guidelines which would help to harmonise national privacy 
legislation and, while upholding such human rights, would at the same time prevent 
interruptions in international flows of data.’ This was shortly followed by the Council 
of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data in January 1981 [6]. This convention stated: ‘The 
purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory of each Party for every 
individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data relating to him ("data protection").’ All of these acts were 
created to protect individual privacy in the face of an increase in the available 
technology to allow records to be transferred swiftly and easily. They were a reaction 
to the change in technology since previously records were often held by an 
organisation on paper or on their own computer network with the possibility of large 
amounts of information being shared considered negligible due to the logistical 
problems. These bills were all enacted in the mid 1970’s to early 1980’s and 
technology for data recording and transfer has moved forward since then. In fact in 
1999 UC Berkley predicted that more data would be stored between 1999 and 2002 
than in the whole history of data storage. It is also of interest to note that international 
organisations required acts to prevent the release of information in cross border 
scenarios.
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The first UK bill to deal with the confidentiality of individual’s data was the Data 
Protection Act of 1984. This has now been superseded by the Data Protection Act of 
1998. The act requires personal data to be
- processed fairly and lawfully
- obtained only for a specific lawful purpose
- adequate, relevant and not excessive
- accurate and up to date
- kept for no longer than necessary
- processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects
- kept secure
- transferred outside the EEA only if there is adequate protection
A survey carried out by the UK Information Commission [7] found that the general 
public still regarded privacy an important issue in society and believe that it is a 
human right. The survey also found that the public viewed the general requirements 
of privacy as very similar to those laid out in the Privacy Act of 1998.
As recently as 2003 the EU produced a directive, The Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, to particularise some of the 
legislation to deal with the issues in improved telecommunication technology. This 
illustrates some of the problems facing legislators protecting against disclosure 
control. The advancement in data storage and transfer technology means that laws 
and practices for preventing disclosure of individual data must evolve rapidly to keep 
pace with this advancement. This places extra burden on statistical organisations to
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ensure that they do not act in a way which either contravenes the new legislation or 
allows for potential disclosure as a result of new technology.
The most recent law to influence the process of disclosure control is the introduction 
in the UK of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 which came into force in 2005. 
The act allows an organisation or an individual to request information from 
organisations which hold data and this request must be granted unless the request falls 
under an exemption. In general this now means that if an organisation does not wish 
to divulge information it must provide a reason rather than simply reject the request. 
This change in the law has made it necessary for statistical organisations to have in 
place stringent disclosure control policy to avoid a potential disclosure through a 
forced release of data.
A major legal problem found by statistical organisations is the definitions of some of 
the terms in statistical disclosure control. For example what is disclosure? Dr Jan 
Holvast writes [8]‘Cox [9] has given the most universal description. In his view, 
disclosure is breaching the pledge of confidentiality by revealing confidential 
respondent data.’ This is very vague and does not answer many legal questions.
There are many ways in which data can be revealed and a decision must be made on 
which of these are as a result of negligence on the part of the statistical organisation. 
This will be laid out in the many laws and treaties on the issue but as society and 
especially technology has evolved public perception of these issues may change. An 
important issue is the terminology pertaining to personal (or sensitive) data. This is 
important in terms of disclosure control since many of the laws and practices are in 
place to ensure that no sensitive data is revealed. What makes this issue so difficult is
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that different people will find different topics sensitive. For example one subject in a 
survey may regard their employment status as a sensitive issue which should not be 
revealed to an outside party whereas another subject may have no problem with their 
employment status being revealed. This problem is a particular concern for the EU 
where countries may have different laws regarding what information on a citizen is 
public knowledge. For example in Sweden each citizen’s annual salary is public 
knowledge whereas in the UK that information would be regarded as sensitive. In the 
UK The Data Protection Act 1998 [10] defines sensitive personal data:
‘2. In this Act "sensitive personal data" means personal data consisting of information 
as to-
(a) the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject,
(b) his political opinions,
(c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature,
(d) whether he is a member of a trade union (within the meaning of the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992),
(e) his physical or mental health or condition,
(f) his sexual life,
(g) the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence, or
(h) any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed 
by him, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such 
proceedings.’
Disclosure issues will without doubt change over the coming years as technology 
advances and public interest grows. Statistical organisations must ensure that their
9
policy follows evolving laws and necessary practices to ensure the privacy of 
respondents is maintained.
1.3 Social Issues associated with Statistical Disclosure Control
It is clear that the issue of statistical disclosure control has many social issues. The 
feeling among many statisticians is that certain types of data require much more 
stringent disclosure control procedures than others. For example in the field of health 
care clearly there are certain topics such as a subject’s abortion history, especially if 
the data was at school level for example, or HTV category which would be deemed as 
sensitive whilst a topic such as a subject’s history of in grown toe nails is not at all 
sensitive. In fact in a leading statistical disclosure computing package (Tau-Argus 
which is to be discussed later) the option is given to describe variables as ‘very 
sensitive’. A comment given by Hundepool and Willenborg [11] on the assignation 
of these variables in the Tau-Argus program is that 'very sensitive variables are 
sometimes taboo in microdata sets -  such as the public use files at Statistics 
Netherlands -, particularly if there are several very sensitive categories (such as 
‘suicide’ for ‘cause of death’).’ Clearly there are differences in how sensitive 
different variables are but this is often a very personal opinion where there are many 
topics that one person would find sensitive that others would not. The difficulty for 
the statistician is that they do not know whether the data provided is deemed very 
sensitive by the subject or whether its potential disclosure does not cause the subject 
any real concern. As always the statistician should err on the side of over protecting 
information about an individual subject rather than risk disclosure.
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Two important issues in the problem of statistical disclosure control are the protection 
of an individual’s data and the attempt to release as much information to society as 
possible. Clearly there is a conflict between these two issues. The simplest way to 
protect the confidentiality of each individual’s data is to not release any information 
gathered by the statistical agency to society although clearly this would also be 
unethical since the ‘greater good of society’ would suffer. This leaves the statistician 
with a trade off to make between the potential harm to the individual due to disclosure 
of their data and the potential harm to society caused by a lack of information. It is 
only recently that statisticians have begun to use statistical methods to address the 
problem of disclosure control. Fienberg [12] writes ‘For far too long, confidentiality 
and disclosure limitation were relegated to the non-statistical part of large-scale data 
collection efforts and, as a consequence, the methods used to address them were ad 
hoc and conservative.’ The use of statistical methods have allowed the release of 
improved levels of data free from disclosure risk although in some situations die data 
cannot be made safe and the release may disclose information about an individual. 
Cox [13] writes that in these situations ‘incompatibilities are resolved in favour of 
preserving confidentiality’
The restriction of access to data collected by statistical organisations is also a social 
and ethical issue associated with statistical disclosure control. The main advantage of 
restricting access to the data is that the data would not have to be adjusted to avoid 
disclosure as access would only be granted to a few individuals who would have no 
interest in inferring information on certain individuals. Those who were granted 
access to the data would then be required to sign confidentiality agreements and have 
their use of the data monitored and subsequently controlled. This would allow
11
groups, such as policy makers in the government, to have access to the unadjusted 
data on which to base crucial policy decisions. Although in theory this would seem a 
reasonable suggestion there are many problems with it. Fienberg [12] writes 
‘Restricted access should only be justified in extreme situations where the 
confidentiality of data in the possession of an agency cannot be protected through 
some form of restriction on the information released.’ A major argument for releasing 
as much data as possible is the hope that this will increase the trust of the public in the 
statistical organisations. If all the data is held by the organisation and only released to 
certain groups (e.g. policy makers or politicians) it could lead to a certain distrust of 
how the information is being used and result in questions about the relationship 
between the statistical organisation and the group and also call into question the 
integrity of the organisation. Any lack of trust in the organisations will result in poor 
(generally incorrect) data being submitted by subjects. Georges Als [14] writes 
‘Despite all the guarantees, the population distrusts the statistical services, and the 
responses it gives are no fuller and truer than those supplied to the Revenue or other 
authorities.’ The more seemingly transparent the statistical organisations are the more 
likely subjects are to give time and thought towards the data they supply resulting in 
better responses.
Since the Freedom of Information Act [15] was introduced on January 1st 2005 it has 
become increasingly important for statistical offices to have in place stringent 
statistical disclosure control policies. These policies have become necessary since 
organisations will have more pressure placed on them than in the past by bodies 
requesting access to data, to which they are now entitled. In a talk given by Kevin 
Dunnion the Scottish Information Commissioner to the Edinburgh branch of the
12
Royal Statistical Society he stated that institutes must divulge information unless 
amongst other things:
1. the statistics were due to be published within 12 weeks
2. data were confidential -  quality of confidence
3. data were personal data
4. data were part of a programme of research.
Clearly all these are important to statistical organisations but both 2 and 3 are 
examples of social issues connected with statistical disclosure control.
Statistical disclosure control is not a purely scientific topic. There are many social 
and ethical considerations to make. This thesis will concentrate mainly on the issues 
raised by the scientific workings of tests and procedures to deal with disclosure 
control but it is important that any statistical organisation constructing policy in the 
field keeps in mind the social and ethical ramifications of their work.
1.4 Issues Arising from Different Forms of Data Sets
The presentation of data in tables is a very common and practical way to disseminate 
data. Tables can come in all forms from a very simple 2x2 table to much more 
complex multi level tables. Most tables required by end users need the marginals to 
be present to allow both a more informed impression to be made of the data and for 
further analysis to be carried out. Unfortunately as with all public exposure of data 
tabular data carries a risk of disclosure. This risk generally occurs when the published
13
tables contain cells with low values and therefore few subjects although if many 
tables on the same data set are produced it may be possible for results to be matched 
and a subject recognised. Clearly the fewer subjects that are in a cell the greater the 
chance an infringement of their anonymity becomes. It would therefore be helpful to 
have efficient techniques to detect and remove this form of potential disclosure in 
tabular data. Fortunately these exist and this thesis will attempt to outline some of the 
techniques which are commonly used. It may be helpful to think of the process of 
reducing the disclosure risk in a table as having four stages:
1. detecting risk of disclosure from the table
2. discovering the degree of risk posed by the table
3. removing (or reducing) the risk of disclosure from the table
4. assessing the loss of information caused by removing the risk of disclosure
Stages 3 and 4 are the balancing act between publishing data that are both accurate 
and useful and the right of the subject to confidentiality. This thesis will attempt to 
cover methodology and issues raised by various techniques to deal with all four 
stages.
Many statistical organisations publish their findings in tabular form. Whether it be in 
published papers, on the web sites or in the national press, data in tabular form are 
simple, informative and user friendly. There is unfortunately the potential for 
individual’s data to be disclosed by these tables. There are many separate issues to 
consider before protecting tables using the various techniques (these will be discussed 
later see chapter 2). One of these issues is whether the table contains magnitude data 
or frequency data. This distinction is essential to the techniques involved in
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disclosure control and it is important that the difference is understood and the 
disclosure control process adjusted accordingly. A table that contains magnitude data 
(example table 1.4.1) is a table that quotes a quantitative value in each cell of a table, 
for example total business turnover or mean blood pressure. A table that contains 
frequency data (example table 1.4.2) is a table that simply quotes the number of 
subjects in a category in each cell, for example number of subjects who are male and 
earn over £30,000 a year or the number of subjects who are over 60 and have a 
clinically high blood pressure.
Age Group
Blood
Pressure
Status
Under 60 Over 60
High 7 12
Normal 45 32
Low 2 14
Total 54 58
Median Income(£)
Sex
Age Group
Male Female
30-40 £21,000 £19,000
40-50 £26,000 £23,000
Table 1.4.1: Fabricated example o f table of Table 1.4.2: Fabricated example of table of
magnitude data. frequency data.
The form of data in the tables makes a difference in both how potential disclosure of 
sensitive data is detected and also how the potential disclosure is removed. It is also 
important for the statistician to ensure that when multiple tables are being produced 
that the information from these tables cannot be combined to cause a disclosure.
A further form of data that may be found in a table is hierarchical data. A hierarchical 
variable is a categorical variable which contains various levels on the single data 
value. For example if there was a geography variable then the single variable may
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contain three parts e.g. ‘continent’, ‘country’, ‘region’. Then say the geographical 
area was Greater Glasgow that would be represented by a variable showing Europe, 
Scotland, Greater Glasgow e.g. EURSCOGG. Or say the geographical area was New 
York then this would be represented by North America, United States of America, 
New York e.g. NAUSANY. These hierarchical variables can be used to produce a 
hierarchical table which, as Willenborg and de Waal [16] write, ‘is like an ordinary 
table with its marginals, except that it has additional subtotals (for each group at each 
level of the hierarchical variable).’ A hierarchical table is simply a set of tables 
represented in one table using the hierarchy. The extra challenge presented by a 
hierarchical table in terms of disclosure control comes from the fact that the extra sub 
totals from the hierarchy can potentially be used to calculate the values of protected 
cells in the same way as an intruder could use the marginals to compute cell values.
An important issue with the design of the statistical disclosure control process is 
whether marginals are included in the table. The presence of marginals makes the 
table much easier to ‘unpick’ for any intruder wanting to make inferences. If no 
marginals are present any cells which risk disclosure could be removed from the table 
and the table published. Unfortunately having the marginal values included would 
allow any intruder, through relatively simple linear equations, to compute the values 
of these cells. This means the cells are no longer protected against the risk of 
disclosure. It therefore seems reasonable to exclude the marginals from the table 
however as mentioned earlier advances in statistical techniques have resulted in 
statistical organisations requiring more detailed data to carry out formal tests. For 
many formal tests and modelling procedures it is not sufficient for only tables with 
incomplete cell values but the table must contain all cell values and the marginals.
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Many other users of the data (such as policy makers) also require complete tables with 
the marginals in order for the data to be useful.
It is important when carrying out the statistical disclosure control process that the 
needs of the final user of the data are discussed. Some of the various disclosure 
control methods may suit one user but useless to another user. For example if a 
newspaper was looking for a small table it would not want any of the cells in the table 
suppressed but may be more inclined to accept rounding of the cell values. 
Suppression is a statistical disclosure technique where cells in the table which are 
deemed sensitive are removed from the table. To allow the marginals to remain in the 
table further cells must be suppressed (a technique called secondary suppression) to 
avoid the value of the suppressed cell being attainable by simple linear equations 
(more detail on suppression can be found in section 2.2.2). Therefore if a group of 
policy makers were looking for a large table where only some of the information was 
crucial they might prefer suppression of some of the sensitive cells which were not 
crucial for their needs. This also highlights the need for the statistician to investigate 
the data before working with it. Certain techniques require a working knowledge of 
the data and in particular variables which can be grouped, are part of a hierarchy or 
have some unusual relationship.
1.5 Non-Statistical Methods for Avoiding Disclosure
Although this thesis will concentrate mainly on statistical methods for controlling 
disclosure risk it must be remembered that non-statistical methods also play an 
important role in the process. If these methods are used properly the need for
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statistical intervention to the data can in some circumstances be greatly reduced with 
the result that more of the utility of the data is retained. It must be noted however that 
there are often disadvantages to these non-statistical methods as there are for 
statistical methods. These methods should though be central to any policy statistical 
organisations have on disclosure control. A good policy will usually contain a 
mixture of statistical and non-statistical methods for disclosure control.
One obvious method of disclosure control is to restrict access to the data. If the data 
is not released to the public there is clearly no (or at least a greatly reduced) risk of 
disclosure. For this to work everyone who has access to the data, whether they be the 
final policy maker or a data analyst, would be required to sign a legal disclaimer 
preventing them from revealing any of the data. This disclaimer could very easily be 
made part of a contract and in fact in many cases this will already be practice. The 
access to the data would then have to be monitored closely either by a specified 
employee or the management of the company to ensure no malpractice occurred. This 
method would allow the statisticians to work with the original data that were 
collected, this is an advantage since removing any potential error in the data will 
allow more accurate further analysis to be presented to policy makers. In theory this 
disclosure control method would seem to be advantageous to both the statisticians and 
society in general however in reality the public want to know how the data they 
provide are used and not have them analysed by statisticians behind close doors with 
no apparent end result. A mentioned in section 1.3 if the public loses trust in the 
statistical organisation the data they supply (if indeed they supply data at all) may 
have reduced accuracy. In a talk given by Gerald Gates [17] of the United Sates
18
Census Bureau it was suggested that the four major issues causing a negative public 
perception of privacy were:
- Fear
- Mistrust
- Misunderstanding
- Loss of Control
Any policy where access to the data is limited will only compound these negative 
public perceptions. In fact Gates also outlined an incident known as the Canadian 
record linkage incident where the data for American Citizens were being held and 
linked together without public knowledge and when this database was uncovered the 
public outcry was enormous. An interesting discussion centres on the public 
perception of privacy and whether the problem with this record linkage was the fact 
that a lot of data on each individual was being collected or whether the fact that it was 
done in secret was the major issue. In a talk given on a study on privacy violations 
and privacy perceptions in ubiquitous multimedia environments, Sasse [18] from the 
University College London found that people want feedback and control. Further 
more she commented on the fact that ‘Users are usually prepared to accept some risks 
to privacy, if there are potential/expected benefits from the system that harbours the 
risk. Also it is important that users need to be aware of risk and have a chance to 
accept it.’ This would seem to suggest that the public do not in general want 
organisations to adopt policy where access to the data is restricted but may be able to 
accept a degree of disclosure risk so long as there was a perceived benefit. This 
implies that statistical organisations should be as open as possible and take time to 
‘market’ the work they are doing to convince the public it is in their interest.
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A method which would allow both the raw data to be used, but in theory allow the 
public more access to the data, is one where a user can request certain statistical 
analysis of certain data from the data holder and the data holder must perform the test 
and provide the (edited slightly) results to the user. In the traditional sense Statistical 
Disclosure Control follows the form:
Data -> Confidentialise -» Analyse
However this technique (called privacy preserving analytics) follows the form:
Data -* Analyse -* Confidentialise
This would mean only the statistical organisation providing the data would have 
access to the raw data needed to run the analysis. The major advantage of this is that 
the analysis is run on the raw data so there is no inaccuracy in the results released to 
the public due to the fact that the data used has been adjusted to avoid disclosure. In 
general the user should be able to ask for any statistical analysis of the data and it 
should be provided in the full form although some analysis may yield results that 
cause potential disclosure and these results are in some way suppressed. One 
approach to do this is the remote server approach (figure 1.5.1).
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Figure 1.5.1: The Remote Server Approach
Secure
work
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ResearcherData
Submit a data 
analysis query
Some
analysis on a 
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modified to 
protect 
privacy
Under this approach a researcher can request an analysis of certain data to be 
produced. This analysis will be carried out by the data provider in a secure workspace 
which will be subject to security procedures. Furthermore the analysis is run on a 
95% sample of the data providing extra protection to the individual’s data. Once the 
analysis has been carried out any results which could lead to direct identification of an 
individual subject are masked or suppressed so as not to reveal the individual. 
Although there is still the chance of some of the results being suppressed the results 
will be more accurate since the analysis has been run on the original data.
This technique has been investigated by CSIRO in Sydney and work on this is 
continuing. At present they have found that certain results cannot be released and 
must be replaced by some less disclosive results. For example scatterplots cannot be 
released so they have been replaced by parallel box plots, exact p-values cannot be 
revealed so a range of possible p-values is given and outliers cannot be revealed but 
the analysis can be carried out both with or without outliers. CSIRO have so far 
found that there is a place for both traditional disclosure control techniques and the 
remote server approach depending on the situation.
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As mentioned above if the data disseminated is a sample taken from the raw data the 
protection given to each individual subject in the data increases. This is because any 
potential intruder who knows that a subject has been part of the study does not know 
for sure whether the data for that subject are included in the disseminated data. 
Clearly the smaller the sample the less likely each individual subject is to be included 
therefore the greater the protection. However the smaller the sample the less accurate 
the data released will be. This is the same trade off realised in all of the disclosure 
control techniques namely data utility versus disclosure risk. The major advantage of 
a sample is that regardless of how small the sample there is still doubt created about 
the presence of each individual subject. Using only a sample of the subjects can be 
easily used with other statistical disclosure techniques to increase the protection 
offered to each individual subject.
1.6 Techniques Used by Other Statistical Organisations
Statistical disclosure control is a growing topic around the world. The growth of 
technology worldwide has made storage of large amounts of data possible in any 
country in the world whilst the development of the World Wide Web and the grid has 
allowed for data to be transferred with ease between countries. Many different 
statistical organisations in many countries in the world have to deal with the problem 
of disclosure control. It has already been mentioned that the European Union has 
introduced legislation regarding the use of data within its organisation and that the 
CSIRO in Australia are working to develop a remote server approach. This section
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will outline some of the laws and methodology used by different statistical 
organisations.
Statistics Netherlands is one of the forerunners in the statistical disclosure control 
field. The organisation has played a large part in the development of the Tau-Argus 
software and is in fact the consortium leader of the CASC programme. The chair of 
the CASC steering committee is Anco Hundepool from Statistics Netherlands. As 
one would expect Statistics Netherlands use Tau-Argus to protect the data it releases 
from potential disclosure. The most commonly used techniques are a dominance rule 
(see section 2.1) to detect potential disclosure and cell suppression with optimal 
secondary suppression (see section 2.2) to remove the potential disclosure from the 
table. There is also the opportunity for bona fide researchers to work on-site at 
Statistics Netherlands to allow the researcher access to data with more detail than 
would be released to the public. The researcher is allowed to use any standard 
software package or even their own software package. Nordholt [19] writes ‘Like all 
employees of Statistics Netherlands, these people who work on-site have to swear an 
oath to the effect that they will not disclose the individual information of respondents.
The researchers who work on-site on economic data have to take the rules of Statistics 
Netherlands’ Centre for Research of Economic Microdata (CEREM) into account.
The most important rules are:
• Researchers must be associated with a recognised research institute (e.g. a 
university);
• There must be a research proposal that conforms to current scientific standards;
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• The researcher and his superior have to sign a confidentiality warrant;
• The researcher obtains only access to the data needed for his project;
• The data do not contain information on names and addresses of the enterprises;
• Data related to the two most recent years will not be supplied;
• It is forbidden to let data, or not safeguarded intermediate results, leave the 
premises of Statistics Netherlands;
• All prospective publications will be screened with respect to risk of disclosure;
• All publications will be in the public domain;
• A public register contains the researcher’s name(s), the research project, the 
publication(s) and the databases provided.’
These laws allow the researcher to work on much more detailed data however 
information can only be taken from the premises with the permission of the 
responsible statistical officer.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics produces a wide variety of statistics covering all 
aspects of life in Australia. As with all respectable statistical institutions they have a 
policy on disclosure control. The principles of the policy are consistent for all subject 
areas although it may be the case that particular methodology changes for the 
different subject areas. The Census and Statistics Act 1905 [20] requires that data 
taken in survey are protected against disclosure and that the act ‘provides a fine of up 
to $5,000 and/or a penalty of 2 years imprisonment for an unauthorised disclosure of 
information collected under the Act.’ Also the Statistics Determination 1983 -  List of 
Regulations [21] states that.
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‘Information, being information included in a class of information to which this 
clause applies, may, with the approval in writing of the statistician, be disclosed 
except where:
(a) in the case of information relating to a person, being an individual -  that 
person;
(b) in the case of information relating to an official body -  the responsible 
Minister in relation to that official body; or
(c) in the case of information relating to an organization other than an official 
body -  a responsible officer of that organisation,
has shown that such disclosure would be likely to enable the identification of that 
particular person or organization.’
It is clear that the Australian Bureau of Statistics have in place rules and regulations to 
ensure that they do not disclose data pertaining to individuals. As mentioned the 
separate departments will have individual methodologies for dealing with the 
problem. In the field of Health Data there are blanket rules which are used to protect 
tables from potential disclosure. These are:
• Any cell which contains 3 respondents or less is suppressed.
• Data are always weighted.
• Weighted data are always rounded to the nearest 100.
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Clients are also discouraged from looking for tables containing too much detail, as 
these will often have large standard errors making the data unreliable.
The U.S. Census Bureau provides data to the public on the United States people and 
economy. An important aspect of the work they do is to release data whilst honouring 
privacy and protecting confidentiality. The Census Bureau use statistical methods to 
ensure the identity of individual subjects or businesses is not disclosed. The U.S. 
Census Bureau Website [22] states ‘The Census Bureau has an internal Disclosure 
Review Board. This board sets the confidentiality rules for all data product releases. 
A checklist approach is used to ensure that potential risks to the confidentiality of the 
data are considered and addressed before any data are released.’ The Census Bureau 
also has a set of ‘Privacy Principles’ [23] which help the organisation design surveys 
whilst considering the respondent’s rights. These are:
• Necessity: Do we need to ask this question? Do we need to collect this 
information?
• Informed Consent: Do you know why we are collecting your information?
• Respectful Treatment of Respondents: Are our efforts reasonable and did 
we treat you with respect?
• Confidentiality: How do we protect your information?
Any violation of the confidentiality of the respondent is seen as a federal offence and 
can result in a fine of up to $250,000 and/or a five-year prison sentence. Furthermore 
the Census Bureau privacy principles [23] state that ‘we promise that we will use 
every technology, statistical methodology, and physical security procedure at our
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disposal to protect your information.’ The Census Bureau frequently use cell 
suppression as a method to remove potential disclosure from a table and this method 
was used in 1980 Census of Population and Housing and is now used for economic 
surveys and censuses. Before the Census Bureau releases any data, a computer 
program is used to check published tables for primary and complementary 
disclosures. The Census in 2000 used a form of rounding to protect some tables from 
the threat of disclosure. Zayatz et al [24] write of the census ‘All cell values are 
rounded according to the following scheme:
0 rounds to 0 
1-7 rounds 4
8 or greater rounds to the nearest multiple of 5.
Totals are constructed before rounding, thus universes remain the same from table to 
table, but the tables are no longer additive.’
Other statistical organisations are currently working on specific disclosure control 
methodologies and policies. For example Statistics New Zealand is looking to 
implement a method of adding noise to the cells in the table. Camden et al [25] writes 
‘There appears to be good potential for extending the method (adding noise) to tables 
of counts, and we hope this will be explored further.’ Also Statistics Norway is 
currently working on a policy/best practice document to deal with statistical 
disclosure control to be implemented autumn 2005.
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Much of the statistical data released in the UK are released under the National 
Statistics Code of Practice: Protocol on Release Practices [26]. This is a document 
published in 2002 which outlines the principles which must be adhered to when data 
are released. Further the National Statistics Code of Practice: Statement of Principles 
[27] outlines the principles which must be adhered to when data is released. There are 
7 main principles in the document including:
1. National Statistics will promote equality of access
2. Final Responsibility for the content, format and timing of release of National 
Statistics will rest with Heads of Profession (in devolved administrations, the 
Chief Statistician) acting in consultation with the National Statistician
7. As much detail as is reliable and practicable will be made available, subject to 
legal and confidentiality constraints
These are the three principles which have the largest bearing on the statistical 
disclosure control and public accountability area of data release whilst the other four 
principles are concerned with the timing of the data release. The protocol goes on to 
expand on the principles by stating that promoting equality of access requires the 
statistical data to be equally available to all at the same time and should be released in 
a format and at a time that will be suitable to the majority of users. This implies that 
data in the UK should not be restricted to certain groups of society (i.e. policy 
makers) and that the statistical organisation has a responsibility to ensure that the 
released data are of a form which is useful and informative to a wide range of 
potential users. The protocol also states that a fixed format should be adopted for data 
which are released regularly and that any significant change to this format should only
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be done after consultation between the relevant statistical organisation and the end 
user. Furthermore the protocol states that although the initial release is targeted at a 
specific audience and as such is potentially focused and simplified there is often a 
large amount of data underlying the initial release and that these should be available 
to the greatest extent possible. However the protocol also states that ‘in order to 
maintain the trust of respondents, information can only be accessible where it does not 
impinge on confidentiality constraints’. This statement is crucial to the field of 
statistical disclosure control since it makes it clear that it is the responsibility of every 
statistical organisation working under the National Statistics Code of Practice to 
release as much data as possible however this information can only be released if 
there is no danger to the confidentiality of individual subjects.
Statistical disclosure control is considered an issue by many organisations worldwide. 
There are clearly many methodologies used by these organisations. It would appear 
that the choice of method is often dependent on the data that the organisation are 
dealing with. It is apparent that all statistical organisations feel the need to have a 
policy on statistical disclosure control where the methods they use are outlined in 
simple terms.
1.7 Tau-Argus
It is often the case that statistical agencies gather data in the form of surveys or 
research and want to disseminate the data in tabular form. The data collected will be 
entered into a computer system as microdata and this microdata will be used to 
construct the tables to be released. As mentioned earlier there are many techniques
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that can be used to protect both tabular data and microdata against potential 
disclosure. To perform these techniques by hand would be extremely time consuming 
and to produce a program or macro for every disclosure scenario would be both 
complex and inefficient. This has led to the production of a set of programmes under 
the heading of Argus. There are two programmes in operation, Mu-Argus and Tau- 
Argus. Mu-Argus is aimed at making sets of microdata safe for dissemination and at 
the time of writing is very much in the development phase whilst Tau-Argus, which 
has been the focus of most of the development so far, is aimed at producing safe 
tables from a set of microdata. The Tau-Argus programme is evolving rapidly with 
small improvements being added regularly although it would appear that the 
framework is in place for a programme that allows the user a large amount of choice 
whilst removing much of the complicated calculations and programming. A major 
aim of the programme would appear to be to give the user control over which 
methods are used for the disclosure control. There are many options available to the 
user and these options cover a large variety of methods for both detecting and 
removing potential disclosure in the tables. The programme allows a lot of user 
interaction in the decisions made in the process of disclosure control. For example 
the user has the option to select cells which should not be used in secondary 
suppression and can give weights to certain cells influencing the likelihood of their 
use in secondary suppression.
The Tau-Argus programme should not be seen as an attempt to replace the role of the 
statistician in disclosure control but as a tool to allow the user to carry out different 
disclosure control techniques without the problems of complex and time consuming 
calculations and computing work. A perceived problem with the programme however
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is that it is not very user friendly and can be complicated for users without a solid 
grounding in the techniques used in statistical disclosure control. It is hoped that with 
time (i.e. in the later versions of the programme) this problem will be minimised with 
the workings of the programme becoming less complex.
The work on the Argus programme has been carried out by CASC (Computational 
Aspects of Statistical Confidentiality). CASC is a group within the EU that works on 
developing new and improved techniques and programmes to deal with the issue of 
statistical disclosure control. The groups website [28] quotes its aims as
‘The research, development and implementation of new techniques for Statistical 
Disclosure Control is the main objective of the CASC project.
The need for more statistical information has a consequence that we should pay more 
attention to the confidentiality aspects. The impact on the Statistical Offices is very 
big if we fail to solve this problem adequately. The project will aim at the 
development of practical tools as well as new research to support the development of 
these tools. Attention will be paid to both tabular data as well as microdata. The 
development of these standard tools serves the harmonisation of the statistical 
production in Europe and will enforce the leading role of Europe in this topic.’
Mu-Argus and Tau-Argus are the main practical tools that are mentioned in the aims 
of the group.
The CASC project began in January 2001 and received funding under the European 
Plan for Research in Official Statistics (EPROS) (see EPROS European Plan for
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Research in Official Statistics 22 September 1999 [29]). Giessing and Hundepool
[30] write ‘The project is meant to be a follow up for the SDC-project which has been 
carried out 1996 to 1999 in the sense that it will build further on the achievements of 
that project, and take over the results and products emerging from the SDC-project/ 
The members of the CASC project team are from the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. The British institutes that are involved in the 
project are the University of Plymouth, the University of Southampton, the Victoria 
University of Manchester and the Office for National Statistics.
As the quoted aims of the CASC website suggest one of the hopes for the Tau-Argus 
programme is that it will become recognised as a Europe wide tool for producing 
disclosure protected tables. This implies that the programme must give a large 
amount of user choice to allow its use in many different scenarios for different types 
of data. Sarah Giessing (member of the CASC steering committee) and Anco 
Hundepool (chair of CASC steering committee) write [30] ‘the software package 
must be able to deal with tables of any size and complexity of structure, facilities must 
be offered to deal with specific problems of particular situations in a flexible, user- 
friendly and comfortable way.’ In the same paper they also list the projects aims to 
achieve that goal which include:
1. Refine and support the integration of desirable qualities and facilities of 
existing software systems for tabular data protection as identified in the best- 
practice study into Tau-Argus.
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3. Significant improvement of the cell suppression algorithms based on the linear 
programming as already supplied along with the package, and supply of 
supplementary heuristic methodology.
5. Development and integration of table-perturbation methodology.’
It is clear that the major responsibility of the CASC project is the development and 
dissemination of the Argus packages. It is in fact true that the CASC project is 
designed around the Argus software and the workings of this software are integral to 
the work done by the project.
The nature of Tau-Argus is that it brings together widely used disclosure control 
techniques and integrates them into one package. As it progresses the idea is that it 
should include the most up to date techniques available. To this end another 
important part of the CASC project is research into new techniques. Anco Hundepool
[31] states that ‘the three main goals of innovation in the proposed project regarding 
tools for tabular data protection will be:
• Firstly to develop data-structures for Tau-Argus that are able to represent the 
cell suppression problem for hierarchical structured and linked tables.
• Secondly, GHQUAR (a further package for disclosure control produced in 
Germany which is ideally suited to large tables) will be integrated into the 
restructured version of Tau-Argus.
• The third main task will be to speed up the linear programming methodology 
in Argus as emerged from the 4th Framework project. This will make Tau- 
Argus capable of solving the larger problems that result from the
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representation of real life tables with many sub-marginals in reasonable 
(computing) time.’
All of the methods that are research are tested on a given set of test data held by the 
CASC project to assess their effectiveness.
1.8 ISD Scenario
ISD is the abbreviation for the Information and Services Division of NHS National 
Services Scotland (formerly the Common Services Agency or CSA). It is the lead 
organisation for healthcare statistical service to NHS Scotland and the Scottish 
Executive Health Department. The official ISD website [32] states that they ‘provide 
a wide range of information support including national data collection, analysis and 
publication of statistics, and the provision of expert advice on information matters.’ 
The official ISD website [32] states the aim of the operation to ‘be an essential 
support service to NHSScotland and the Scottish Executive Health Department; 
responsive to the needs of NHSScotland as the delivery of healthcare evolves; 
proactive in determining and advising how best to use Information and Information 
Technology to ensure efficient, effective delivery of patient care.’
Since January 2001 the statistics released by ISD have been covered by National 
Statistics. National Statistics was introduced in June 2000 which changed the way 
official statistics in the UK were governed and how accountability was assigned. ISD 
now adheres to the National Statistics Code of Practice Protocol on Release Practices 
as it is implemented in Scotland via the Scottish Executive’s Statement of
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Compliance. A key requirement of National Statistics is that statistical releases 
should be planned and the arrangements for the release should be made available.
ISD complies with a policy of releasing statistics at the earliest possible date although 
in certain cases the releases are made in orderly manner. In certain cases this results 
in the release of data being delayed although the disadvantages of this delay are 
outweighed by the advantages of the increased understanding given by the ordered 
release of the data. The work of ISD also requires the organisation to comply with the 
Freedom of Information Act 2002. The act gives new powers to members of the 
public who wish to access information held by public bodies. The nature of the act 
means that public bodies (such as ISD) must have procedures ready to deal quickly 
with any such request.
The main aim therefore of ISD is to collect data on many aspects of the health service 
and to provide useful information from these data to inform policy making orlet tax 
payers know what is being achieved in the NHS. Clearly these data are important for 
public accountability and decision making in Scotland since the trends and variations 
in the ISD data may effect where and on what resources are allocated. These data can 
come from many fields for example, from an ISD Scotland leaflet [33],; ‘information 
on hospital admissions, patients with cancer, waiting lists, childhood immunisations 
and earnings paid to NHS Scotland staff.’ ISD works in partnership with most 
branches of the health service e.g. Health Boards, G.P.S, hospitals, local authorities 
and voluntary organisations to collect the necessary data. The nature of much of these 
data is that they can identify individual patient’s personal health data which is 
sensitive and therefore ISD must ensure that steps are taken to protect these data.
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As a standard, ISD have security guidelines on the holding of personal data and how 
they can be used. Authorisation is required for any employee to have access to 
personal health information and this authorisation and use of data is monitored closely 
while health boards and hospitals are only granted access to information on their own 
residents/patients. ISD also have specific posts to ensure the protection of patient’s 
confidentiality. They have an individual, known as a ‘Caldicott Guardian’ with the 
sole job of ensuring that individual’s personal data are being handled properly and 
also a Privacy Advisory Committee which comprises of mainly non-NHS members 
which advises ISD on the use of personal data for research. Furthermore it is a duty 
of all ISD staff (and honorary contributors such as students) to protect patient 
confidentiality. ISD also follow the laws given by the Data Protection Act 1998 
which gives an individual:
The right to know how ISD use your personal health information.
- The right to object to our use of your information. You can ask ISD to change 
or restrict the way we use your information.
- The right to access any personal information that we ISD may hold on you.
1.9 Aims of the Thesis
The major aim of this thesis is to investigate the effects of existing statistical 
disclosure control techniques on tabular data with specific mention being made to the 
issues surrounding statistical disclosure control in the ISD scenario. The practicalities 
and methodology of various techniques will be discussed with further discussion on 
the advantages and disadvantages of the techniques in certain scenarios. The
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methodology will be described in detail so as to give the reader an understanding of 
the underlying theory behind the techniques however when using the techniques in 
practice knowledge of the underlying theory is not essential. This is due to the fact 
that many of the techniques are available in statistical computing packages designed 
to deal with potential disclosure.
Many of the social issues related to statistical disclosure control have already been 
discussed earlier in chapter 1 (in particular in section 1.3) and the effects of these 
social issues on the disclosure control process will be discussed throughout the thesis. 
Many of these issues will have an effect on which disclosure control technique will be 
favoured by a statistician and may also affect the parameters used in the techniques.
The effect of various disclosure control techniques will be investigated by applying 
the techniques to tables produced from real data. Where possible the techniques will 
be carried out using the Tau-Argus programme. The resulting tables will then be 
analysed using a measure of information loss between the actual table and the 
disclosure controlled table. The aim is to compare the information loss incurred when 
using the various disclosure control techniques and comparing these techniques to the 
tables which would be produced using current ISD policy. This should hopefully 
provide recommendations or at least general advise for ISD should they choose to 
update their statistical disclosure control policy.
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2. Disclosure Control Techniques for Tabular Data
2.1 Theory and Practicalities of Detecting Potential Disclosure in 
Tabular Data
It is extremely important that a proper check for potential disclosure in the data is 
carried out before data are published. This section attempts to investigate advanced 
methods of disclosure detection. It was stressed in section 1.4 that it is important to 
distinguish between tables containing magnitude data and tables containing frequency 
data. This was partly due to the fact that when it comes to detecting potential 
disclosure in tables there are different techniques for the two separate forms of data. 
This section will show techniques for detecting potential disclosure for both forms. It 
is of interest to note that the technique used for detecting potential disclosure in the 
data should not be published with the data as this can give an intruder information 
which can be used to estimate the original cell value.
Statistical disclosure does not only occur when an intruder can explicitly uncover a 
data value for an individual but disclosure is also said to occur when an intruder can 
estimate the value to a certain range. An interval in which the true cell value lies can 
usually be derived, using the other values and a linear computing programme, for 
each cell in the table. This interval is called a feasibility interval. For a cell to be 
regarded as ‘safe’ the feasibility interval should be acceptably large. The statistician 
should specify this feasibility interval in advance ensuring that it is large enough to 
sufficiently protect the individual subjects.
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2.1.1 Frequency Data
As mentioned in section 1.4 a table containing frequency data (example table 1.4.2) is 
a table that simply quotes the number of subjects in a category in each cell.
Disclosure in this form of table can be quite difficult to detect. For example it seems 
reasonable to assume that there is a high risk of disclosure if there is a cell in the table 
that contains only one subject but this is not always the case. If we think of statistical 
disclosure as occurring when the release of the data enables a third party to learn more 
about the subject than already known the following simple example illustrates why. 
Imagine a small survey carried out looking into unemployment figures by sex and 
area released the following results (Table 2.1.1 and 2.1.2)
Area: A Sex
Male Female All
Unemployed
Yes 4 1 5
No 14 17 31
All 18 18 36
Table 2.1.1: Fabricated Example o f Employment Figures by Sex for Area A.
Area: B Sex
Male Female All
Unemployed
Yes 6 2 8
No 20 19 39
All 26 21 47
Table 2.1.2: Fabricated Example o f Employment Figures by Sex for Area B.
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Ignoring the protection offered by the fact that the study is a sample, at first sight this 
table would appear to disclose information about the unemployed female in area A 
but this is not the case. Assuming that there are figures from other areas and this was 
not the only area studied there is no way of making an inference on one of the 
variables even by knowing the other two variables i.e. assuming the intruder knows 
the subject is from area A and unemployed there is no way of knowing whether they 
are male and female, similarly knowing that the subject is female and unemployed is 
not enough to say they are from area A.
This example shows that tables that sometimes can appear disclosive actually do not 
contain a large disclosure threat so formal techniques should be used to check for 
potential disclosure. This section will in the main focus on explaining the workings 
of three rules to detect potential statistical disclosure. These rules will be the so- 
called across cell test, a test measuring the percentage of subjects in sensitive'cells 
(p% sensitive cell rule say) and the minimum frequency rule.
In this section a 2-way table of frequency data (Table 2.1.3) will be used to illustrate 
how the techniques described to tackle the problem in frequency data work in 
practice.
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Variable 2
E F G H Total
A 23 3 37 18 81
B 1 15 12 119 147
Variable C 54 43 8 4 109
1 D 19 16 22 10 67
Total 97 77 79 151 404
Table 2.1.3: Fabricated Example: Frequency Data Table.
2.1.1.1 Across Cell Test
The across cell test is suggested as an efficient method for detecting disclosure in 
tabular data by the Government Statistical Service Methodology Series No.4: Report 
of the Task Force on Disclosure (December 1995) [2]. The report gives the definition 
of the rule as:
The ‘across cells’ test for non-disclosure in tables of counts or values
‘A sufficient condition for non-disclosure in a table is that each non-empty one­
dimensional subset of the table is distributed in such a way that every combination of 
(k-c) individuals, where k is the number in the line and c the maximum size of a co­
operation group, satisfies the non-proximity conditions for that dimensional 
classification.’
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The user must define the proximity conditions before carrying out the test. The 
proximity condition is the percentage (say p%) to which the true value can be 
estimated (+/- p%) which constitutes a disclosure risk. This condition must be 
specified for each case individually although it is believed that p=40 is a relatively 
safe whilst relatively unrestrictive proximity condition. Also in practice it is usually 
assumed that c=l i.e. each subject in the cell does not work with any other subject to 
attempt to uncover information about the remaining subjects in the study. The rule is 
much simpler to use on data where the variable groups are defined by ranges, e.g. age 
groups of 20-30, 30-40,40-50 etc, rather than on data where the variable groups are 
separate entities, e.g. different strains of a disease.
The test can be simplified by grouping the variables in such a way to reduce the 
proximity assumptions to a sufficient equivalent involving the number of empty cells. 
The definition of the simplified test (from [2]) is:
Simplified ‘across cells’ test for non-disclosure in tables of counts or values
‘If the values of the dimension variables are grouped such that two non-zero cells in 
each line exceeds the minimum range defined by the proximity assumptions then a 
sufficient condition for non-disclosure is that:
every non-empty one-dimensional subset of the table must have
either three contiguous non-empty cells
or two contiguous non-empty cells, both greater than V
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The simplified test cannot be used in most scenarios. The reason for having the 
simplified test is that it can be carried out manually for small two-dimensional tables, 
large tables or tables of higher dimensions however require automated checking.
This simplified version of the test is one of the major advantages of using the across 
cell test when compared to other rules. A further advantage of the across cell test is 
that it allows the user to take into account the fact that contributors in the cell may not 
only want to make inferences on other contributors in the cell but may work together 
with other cell members to do this. This is particularly prevalent in business statistics 
where coalitions are relatively likely to be formed between two similar businesses 
although it may also be applicable in other fields.
However the across cell test does have disadvantages. The major disadvantage of the 
rule is that it requires a large amount of computing power since all of the feasibility 
intervals must be calculated for each subject in each cell. For small tables this is not a 
problem however if the test is run on large, potentially multi dimensional, tables this 
becomes an important issue. Another disadvantage is that the user must predict the 
size of a potential coalition. This may cause a problem if the table is being protected 
by a statistician that is not up to date on the issues surrounding the data. Clearly the 
statistician could go to an expert in the area for advice but this is time consuming and 
inconvenient.
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2.1.1.2 p% Sensitive Cell Rule
This method is outlined by Willenborg and de Waal [34].
The basic concept of this rule is that there is a higher disclosure risk when the number 
of subjects in one cell is close to the number of subjects in the margin. For example if 
the row contains 5 subjects and one cell contains 4 subjects then there is clearly a 
higher risk of disclosure. This risk of disclosure is especially prevalent in studies 
where subjects have some prior information on the other subjects, for example a 
business study where certain information may be public knowledge or may be shared 
among co-operative businesses. This scenario where one cell dominates the row may 
not in fact constitute disclosure but the statistician should be aware of the situations 
where it may cause a risk.
For this rule the variables are split into two groups, identifying variables and unknown 
variables. Identifying variables are variables which are common/public knowledge 
and are used to identify someone. Unknown variables are variables that are private to 
the individual and are not part of public knowledge. In table 2.1.1 sex and area would 
be thought of as identifying variables since they are generally regarded as public 
knowledge from birth records (for sex if necessary) or the electoral roll (for area). 
Employment status would often be regarded as an unknown variable since this is 
usually sensitive information. It can be argued that employment status is public 
knowledge through benefit records etc., but a subject’s employment status is far less 
likely to be public knowledge than their sex or area of residence and is probably 
sensitive enough to be thought of as an unknown variable. This distinction is an
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important one since it can be assumed that an intruder has full knowledge of a 
subject’s identifying variables making the risk of disclosure of the unknown variables 
of interest.
It is not always obvious which of the variables are identifying variables and which are 
unknown variables. There are also infinite combinations of identifying and unknown 
variables that can be used. Here the ‘worst case’ scenario is considered where all 
variables are identifying variables (Zi, Z2,..., Zk say), which can be treated as one 
categorical variable (Z say), except one unknown variable (Y say). The disclosure 
risk is highest when the distribution of Y is highly concentrated for any value of Z. 
Clearly the highest concentration (and therefore the highest disclosure risk) occurs 
when the value of Y is the same for any value of Z. This theory can be applied to 
tables where if one cell in the row corresponding to variable Y contains all, or the 
majority, of the subjects this constitutes a disclosure risk. For example consider table
2.1.3 and suppose that variable 1 is a variable which is unknown to the general public.
Variable 2
E F G H Total
A 23 3 37 18 81
B 1 15 12 119 147
Variable C 54 43 8 4 109
1 D 19 16 22 10 67
Total 97 77 79 151 404
Table 2.1.4: p% sensitive test applied to Table 2.1.3 -  unsafe row is highlighted in 
bold.
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Using the p% sensitive ceil rule it may be that category B of variable 1 poses a 
potential disclosure threat due to the fact that 119 of the 147 subjects in the category 
are present in one cell. This is in fact 80.95% of the subjects in this category in the 
one cell. This appears a large amount however whether this is too large is a 
subjective decision here. In practice it is possible to adopt a simple rule such as; a 
row is sensitive if at least p% of the subjects fall into a sensitive category of Y. P 
must be specified in advance according to what the statistician perceives as a 
reasonable value.
Table 2.1.4 shows that one of the major advantages of the p% sensitive cell rule is that 
it is a simple rule to implement. Very little computing power or indeed time will be 
needed to investigate the rule. The rule also takes into account the number of subjects 
in each row and uses the percentage of subjects in each cell as the test value rather 
than simply imposing an arbitrary minimum value required in each cell.
However there are certain disadvantages of the rule. It may be the case that although 
most of the subjects fall into one cell due to the make up of the table there is no 
disclosure risk due to a similar scenario as shown in table 2.1.1 and table 2.1.2. 
Another disadvantage of the rule is that if a cell fails the test then the whole 
row/column has to be suppressed which may result in an unnecessarily large amount 
of information loss. Furthermore the statistician must make a decision on which 
variables are deemed sensitive. This is not always straightforward, as different people 
will have different views on whether certain information is sensitive.
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2.1.1.3 Minimum Frequency Rule
The minimum frequency rule states that a cell is considered unsafe if it contains less 
than n subjects. The number of subjects required to make the cell safe must be 
specified by the statistician in advance. The idea is that the more subjects a cell 
contains, the lower the risk of an intruder identifying one subject in the cell and if 
enough subjects are in the cell this risk becomes acceptably low.
This rule is very simple but can in certain cases be very efficient. It is interesting to 
note that the minimum frequency rule is also often used for magnitude data. In the 
Tau-Argus programme the Minimum Frequency Rule can be used if the cell items are 
either a response variable or just simply the frequency. The rule simply states that a 
cell is unsafe if the number of contributors is less than a specified frequency (n say). 
The user must select a value for n. Popular choices for n include 3 (the default in 
Tau-Argus) and 5. When the Minimum Frequency Rule is chosen the user must 
specify a Range. This is to allow secondary suppressions to be carried out to give the 
required protection for each suppression. This range is given as a percentage and it 
means that a cell is only safe if it is suppressed and an intruder cannot predict the true 
value, using the other cell values and the marginals, to within the chosen percentage 
of the true value. The Tau-Argus user manual [35] states ‘For example, if this value 
was set to equal 30%, it would mean an attacker would not be able to calculate an 
interval for this cell to within 30% of the actual value when looking at the safe output. 
Following this, the secondary suppressions may be carried out.’
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If the minimum frequency rule was carried out on table 2.1.3 and n was chosen to be 
5 there would be three unsafe cells.
V ariab le  2
E F G H Total
A 23 3 37 18 81
B 1 15 12 119 147
V ariab le C 54 43 8 4 109
1 D 19 16 22 10 67
Total 97 77 79 151 404
Table 2.1.5: Minimum frequency test applied to Table 2.1.3 -  unsafe cells are 
highlighted in bold.
This rule for detecting potential disclosure would have shown a risk in this case in 
three of the cells (in bold) and table 2.1.5 would have to be adjusted in some way 
before it was released. The simplicity with which this is done is one of the major 
advantages of the minimum frequency rule. It can easily be seen if a cell entry is 
lower than the required minimum frequency. It also allows the user to make their 
own decision on what number of subjects are required in a cell for it to be considered 
safe. The minimum frequency rule can also be used on both frequency and magnitude 
data.
On the other hand a major disadvantage of the minimum frequency rule is that it is 
over simple. There are many occasions where a cell with (say) 1 subject may cause 
no disclosure risk and under this rule the cell would be considered unsafe. Therefore
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this rule may result in a number of cells being unnecessarily suppressed resulting in 
an unnecessary loss of information.
2.1.2 Magnitude Data
In most cases the rules used to check for potential disclosure are different when 
magnitude data is used. As mentioned in section 1.4 a table containing magnitude 
data (example table 1.4.1) is a table that quotes a quantitative value in each cell of a 
table, for example median income or mean blood pressure. It should be clear that the 
minimum number of subjects in a non-zero cell must be three since if there was only 
one subject in the cell the value of the variable would be disclosed to the whole public 
and if there are two subjects in the cell the value of the variable for one subject would 
be disclosed to the other subject in the cell. Since the values in the cells are 
quantitative it is often of interest to know the range to which an intruder can estimate 
the true value. Disclosure can be said to occur if the intruder can estimate the true 
value to a small range not necessarily the exact value. Section 2.1.2 will in the main 
focus on explaining the workings of two rules for detecting the risk of statistical 
disclosure. These rules will be the so-called across cell and within cell tests and the 
dominance rule.
2.1.2.1 Across Cell and Within Cell (P,Q% Test) Tests
The across and within cell test is an extension of the rule for detecting potential 
disclosure for frequency data given in the Government Statistical Service 
Methodology Series No.4: Report of the Task Force on Disclosure [2], The extension
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comes from the within cell part of the test which is required when dealing with values. 
Firstly an across cell test must be performed on the data. This is done in exactly the 
same way as the across cell test in section 2.1.1. Once this test has been carried out a 
further test, the within cell test, must be carried out on the data.
The idea of the within cell test is to determine whether the range of values for which 
the value of the variable for one subject in the cell can be estimated by another subject 
in that cell is small enough to constitute a disclosure of information. Protecting 
against this sort of disclosure is often much more complex than protecting solely 
against an outside intruder although in many cases it is more likely that an intruder 
will be another subject in the study. An example of the desire of an intruder to 
disclose information on a subject from within the same cell would be in a business 
survey investigating turnover of businesses in a certain field. One of the businesses in 
the cell could be competing for a contract with another business in the same cell and 
having information on their turnover could be beneficial. Therefore in this 
circumstance the confidentiality of all the businesses should be safeguarded. Clearly 
in this type of scenario the businesses may have auxiliary information on each other 
making the task of disclosure control even more complicated.
To carry out the test a proximity condition must be specified in advance. As for the 
across cell test the proximity condition is the percentage (say p%) to which the true 
value can be estimated (+/- p%) which constitutes a disclosure risk. The assumption 
is that a subject in a cell knows his own value precisely and in spite of this must not 
be able to estimate the value of another contributor to within p%. It is also prudent to 
assume some prior knowledge of the other subjects in the cell (i.e. the subject can
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estimate the value given by the other subjects to within q%). This would be 
especially true in an example such as the business example above. With these 
assumptions in mind the within cell test proceeds as follows (as printed in the 
Government Statistical Service Methodology Series No.4: Report of the Task Force 
on Disclosure [2]):
‘Suppose x1,x2,x3 ..jcn are the values summed in a table cell and that contributor x2 is 
attempting to disclose the value contributed by x1. Assuming he can estimate 
x3,...xn to within q percent, then his estimate for x1is the range
cell (i)
This simplifies to
(2)
So the condition for this to be wider than the range x1 x 1 ±
(3)’
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In theory this test should be carried out for each subject attempting to find out 
information on every other subject but it is clear from the formula that the most 
disclosive situation is when the subject that makes the second largest contribution is 
estimating the value for the subject that makes the largest contribution. Therefore if 
the data does not cause a disclosure risk in this scenario it is safe to assume that there 
is no disclosure risk from that cell. Unfortunately this method can be quite restrictive 
especially when there is a high prior knowledge (q%) assumed.
A further precaution must be taken if it is thought some of the subjects are 
cooperating to estimate information about a subject. If it is assumed that there will be 
c co-operators then the non-disclosure becomes:
q
X l< n XZ - +2** (4)P
The within cell test is often referred to as the p,q% rule. A special case of the within 
cell test is the p% rule where it appears that potential intruders are assumed to have no 
prior knowledge of the subjects in the table. In fact Loeve [36] writes about the rule 
‘it is a priori known that all contributions are non-negative. In fact, the p% rule is a 
special case of the p-q rule with an upper and a lower q parameter. The a priori 
information about every contribution is that it lies between zero and infinity.’
Basically the rule states that any cell in which after publication the true value of any 
respondent can be estimated to within p% constitutes a potential disclosure risk. This 
rule has been used and was in fact used for the 1992 US Economic Census but Eric 
Schulte Nordholt [37] writes ‘not many countries have already experience in using 
other rules than the dominance rule for the identification of sensitive cells in tables.
52
When the p-percent rule and the pq rule will become available in standard software 
packages for statistical disclosure control it can thus be expected that these rules will 
become more popular.’ The p% rule is available in the Tau-Argus programme. The 
rule states that a cell is unsafe if the value of the largest contributor to the cell can be 
determined to an accuracy of p% by a coalition size N from within the group. It is 
often the case that N is taken to be 1 i.e. it is not often expected that coalitions are 
formed between subjects in the cell. The user selects the values of p and N required 
for the rule they wish to implement. A popular choice (the default choice) is p=10 
and N=1 i.e. the second largest subject (worse case scenario with no coalition) cannot 
determine the value of the largest subject to an accuracy of better than 10%.
Clearly the rule has both the advantages and the disadvantages from the across cell 
test in spite of the fact the within cell test is also used. The within cell test however 
has further advantages and disadvantages. One of the advantages of the within cell 
test is that thought is given to the fact that members in the same cell may wish to 
disclose information on each other and furthermore takes into account that these cell 
members may work together to achieve this. The test also takes into account the fact 
that the value of the second largest contributor to a cell influences the degree of 
protection for the largest contributor to a cell. This is often important but is 
overlooked by many rules. Furthermore the rule takes into account the fact that the 
intruder(s) may have prior knowledge on other members in the cell other than the one 
they wish to disclose information on.
As with the across cell test a major disadvantage of the within cell test is that a large 
amount of computing power may be needed since proximity ranges for each cell must
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be calculated. A disadvantage also found with the across cell test is that the user must 
predict the size of a potential coalition and furthermore must predict the potential 
prior knowledge the intruder has of subjects in the cell. This may cause a problem if 
the table is being protected by a statistician with no expertise in the area of the data. 
Clearly the statistician could consult an expert for advice however this will cause the 
process to potentially lengthen in time scale and cost.
2.1.2.2 Dominance Rule
The dominance rule, or (n,k)-test as it is sometimes known, is a common and 
relatively simple rule used to detect potential disclosure in tables of magnitude data. 
The idea behind the rule is to find cells in which few subjects account for a large 
proportion of the cell total. Westlake [38] writes ‘This rule is widely used, but it 
measures Dominance, not Sensitivity and is thus disliked by theoreticians.’ There can 
clearly be disclosure issues if one or two subjects contribute most of the data in a cell. 
For example if there was a survey of the number of brain operations carried out in 
British hospitals in a year and in one hospital there were found to be 400 and one of 
five surgeons knew they had carried out 300 operations this may cause internal 
problems in the hospital. There are many situations where this problem could arise so 
it is prudent to check for this disclosure before releasing any tables.
To carry out the test the parameters n and k must be specified. The parameter n is the 
size of a (if any) potential coalition. This is usually taken as one, since it is assumed 
that no coalition will be formed, although occasionally it will be taken as two. The 
parameter k is the threshold value. In general the rule says that a cell is potentially
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dsclosive if the largest n values account for more than k% of the cell total. Formally 
(vith notation from Willenborg/de Waal [34]) this can be written as:
‘Suppose x1,x2,x3'..jcn are the values summed in a table cell and that these values are 
ordered with jqthe largest i.e. x1^ x2t> ... ^  xn. Also denote the sensitivity measure 
(ie. the disclosure risk of the cell) as S(x). Then for the nth cell
The cell does not have a potential disclosure risk if k .’
The dominance rule is the most widely used rule for detecting disclosure although it 
dees have some theoretical problems. Cuppen [39] writes ‘Although the (n,k)-
directly clear. This is because the (n,k)-dominance rule does not entirely account for 
the internal structure of the cell. It compares the relative size of the sum of the n 
largest contributors to the size of the cell total, but it does not account for the relative 
size of largest contributor versus the other n -  1 largest contributors or versus the 
remaining contributors.’ In the Tau-Argus programme the Dominance Rule is used if 
the cell items are a response variable. The rule states that a cell is unsafe if n subjects 
in the cell contribute more than k% of the total value of the cell. The user must select 
he values of n and k they wish to use. A popular choice (in fact the default choice) is 
i=3 and k=75 although any sensible option is acceptable since other factors may 
iffect the choice of these parameters.
(5)
dominance is quite standard, the protection level it offers at the respondent level is not
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An advantage of the Dominance Rule, which may have been considered by the 
programmers of Tau-Argus, is that it is relatively simple. It does not (especially for a 
small table) take a lot of computing power to determine whether a cell fails the test. It 
also offers good protection to the large contributors to the cell since if the large 
contributors contribute too much of the total of the cell it is suppressed.
However as mentioned earlier the dominance rule is disliked by theoreticians since it 
measures dominance and not sensitivity. This is clearly a disadvantage since the user 
wants to protect any cell which is regarded as sensitive in terms of risk of potential 
disclosure and a test of dominance (which is simply a measure of the size of a value 
compared to the other values in the cell) is not as helpful as a test of sensitivity. 
Another disadvantage of the dominance rule is that it does not take into account the 
fact that the value of the second largest contributor to a cell influences the degree of 
protection for the largest contributor to a cell.
2.13 Summary of Techniques Used to Detect Potential Disclosure in Tabular 
Data
The techniques which have been described to detect potential disclosure are 
summarised in table 2.1.6.
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Technique Data Used On Parameters
Dominance Rule Magnitude n -  number of contributors 
k -  percentage contributed
P% Rule (across and 
within cell test)
Magnitude p -  accuracy of estimation 
n -  size of coalition
P,Q% Rule Magnitude p -  accuracy of estimation 
q -  accuracy of intruder prior knowledge 
of other subjects 
n -  size of coalition
Minimum Frequency Magnitude and 
Frequency
n -  minimum number of contributors
P% Sensitive Cell 
Rule
Frequency p -  percentage of subjects in sensitive 
category
Across Cell Test Frequency p -  accuracy of estimation 
c -  size of coalition
Table 2.1.6: Summary of Potential Disclosure Detection Techniques. Techniques 
available in Tau-Argus are shown in italics.
2.2 Theory and Practicalities of Removing Potential Disclosure in 
Tabular Data
Should the tests for potential disclosure indicate a risk of disclosure the table can 
clearly not be printed in its current form. This situation gives a statistician a problem. 
The idea of the study carried out will have been to produce results that can be viewed 
by some public body and usually to simply not publish any results due to potential 
disclosure is unacceptable. This necessitates the need to have techniques to in some 
way modify the table so that it can be viewed by the public but not result in potential 
disclosure of information on an individual subject. Some of the steps outlined in 
section 1.5 to protect against disclosure, such as running the analysis on a sample of
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:he data rather than the whole data, may have already been implemented or could now 
)e implemented but there are statistical techniques which can be used to protect the 
produced table. The techniques used to remove potential disclosure in tables fall into 
wo categories: perturbative and non-perturbative. The idea behind perturbative 
nethods is to adjust the data (i.e. give it error) in such a way as to protect the identity 
of individuals. Non-perturbative methods are techniques to alter the table (mainly by 
suppressing some results) whilst not altering the data. Clearly both methods result in
i loss of information in the table but are obviously preferable to no table being 
published due to potential disclosure. This section will attempt to cover methodology 
aid issues raised by both categories of techniques used to remove potential disclosure
ii the data.
2.2.1 Perturbative Techniques
As mentioned earlier perturbative techniques attempt to change the data in such a way 
that the disclosure risk is decreased whilst trying to retain as much of the information 
as possible. The clear disadvantage of this is that the data in the output are different 
fiom the raw data collected. This can result in a potential reduction in the quality of 
the data. It could also lead to those without statistical knowledge to dismiss the 
results as a fabrication and give them no credibility. It is important therefore that the 
techniques are statistically sound so as to allow the statistician to have confidence that 
the results produced still have statistical merit. This is especially important to 
statisticians who have to produce results for a non-statistician e.g. a statistician 
presenting results to a government minister. A major advantage of this form of 
disclosure removal is that no cells in the table are suppressed so no values are
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‘hidden’ from the public. This section aims to investigate some of these perturbative 
techniques and show the theory behind them. Two of the most common perburbative 
techniques are adding noise and rounding.
2.2.1.1 Adding Noise
Adding noise is a relatively simple technique that can be used to purposefully alter the 
data so as to mask the true values given by individual subjects. It involves adding 
random variation to all the cells in the table. It can be a very effective way to protect 
against potential disclosure since an intruder should not be able to make any 
inferences on the data in the table since these data have (potentially) been subject to 
the addition of noise. Unfortunately adding noise to the cells in the table means that 
additivity of the table is not guaranteed so if additivity is important this method 
clearly cannot be used. When adding noise to the cells it is important to ensure that 
no systematic bias is added to the data. Therefore the expected value of each cell 
should be the same as the original value after adding some noise. The technique of 
adding noise is widely accepted as effective and is outlined by Willenborg and de 
Waal [34]. The notation used in this section is the same as in the book.
There are a variety of ways in which noise can be added to the table. In all these ways 
it is important that a random value is added to each cell in the table, although it is 
sometimes possible to exclude some cells such as empty cells. It is also important 
that the type and amount of noise added must be consistent with the type of table e.g. 
if the original table contains frequency data then the table after adding noise must also 
contain frequency data.
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Suppose there is a cell with value a then adding noise to the cell will change the 
value to a'= a + sa where E(sa) = 0 and Var{sa) = <j2a. The expectation of the error
is zero to ensure no systematic bias is introduced and this must hold in all cases. The 
variation of the error can be adjusted for different tables and circumstances. A very 
simple system for adding noise is to add either 1, 0 or -1 to each cell with the value to 
be added to each cell selected randomly. There are more complex systems to add 
noise. Willenborg and de Waal [35] suggest adding proportional noise to the data 
claiming that this is effective when the cell values are spread over a wide range. This 
is again a relatively simple technique where o  is proportional to a , e.g. cr = acr0 for
some <r0 > 0, and error given by this proportional variance is then added to a to give
a'= a + cr.
An alternative to additive noise, that is in some cases preferable, is multiplicative 
noise. To introduce multiplicative noise there is the original cell value a and a 
random variable y . The original cell value is multiplied with this random variable to
give the the new value a'= aya where E(ya) = 1 and Var(ya)=cr\ . In this case the
expectation of the variable is one (since it is now multiplicative noise and not additive 
noise) to ensure there is no systematic bias introduced and the variance of the variable 
can again be adjusted.
Using this technique of multiplicative noise it is possible to add noise to the table and 
protect additivity. To achieve this the marginals must be adjusted using multiplicative 
noise and then iterated proportional fitting (IPF) is used to spread the adjusted
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marginals around the individual cells in the table. This results in a table, which is 
additive, that has been protected against the risk of disclosure due to the introduction 
of noise.
Table 2.2.1 gives an example of how table 2.1.3 would look if additive noise was 
used and the simple system for adding noise of adding either 1, 0 or -1 to each cell, 
with the value to be added to each cell selected randomly, was also used.
V ariab le  2
E F G H Total
A 23 2 38 17 81
B 1 14 11 119 147
V ariab le C 54 42 8 5 110
1 D 18 17 23 10 67
Total 98 77 79 150 403
Table 2.2.1: Adding noise technique applied to Table 2.1.3.
Table 2.2.1 has now been protected against potential disclosure due to the uncertainty 
added to each of the cells however it is no longer additive. A major disadvantage 
with adding noise, as illustrated in table 2.2.1, is that making the table additive is not 
practical in many cases. This is because doing so requires fairly complex and time- 
consuming proportional fitting. Any table which is not additive is in general disliked, 
especially by those with no (or limited) statistical knowledge. This is understandable 
because to those unfamiliar with these techniques the table will look incorrect. 
Similarly it is difficult to explain to an end user the process of adding noise and how
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results which have simply had numbers added to them can still give statistically sound 
results.
However adding noise to the table to prevent potential disclosure has certain 
advantages. One advantage of adding noise is that it is very simple to ensure that no 
systematic bias is added to the data. This is done by ensuring that the random 
variable which is added to the cell value has an expectation of zero. In general adding 
noise gives the user a large amount of choice when it comes to deciding how the data 
are protected. For example the user can define the noise to be simply randomly 
adding 1, 0 or -1 to the original value or they can make a complex statistical model to 
model the noise. The user also has the choice between additive or multiplicative 
noise and can choose any random variable from which to generate the noise. These 
decisions can be made by considering the size and spread of the data present in the 
table. Another advantage is that adding noise means that no cells have to be 
suppressed. The advantage of this is that the table appears complete and it doesn’t 
appear as if some data has been ‘hidden’ from the public or end user.
2.2.1.2 Rounding
Another technique used to adjust the data in the table to avoid potential disclosure is 
to carry out rounding on the cell values in the table. This offers protection against 
disclosure since an intruder cannot make clear inferences on the value of the cell since 
they do not know the true value of the cell. Unfortunately it also results in a loss of 
precision in the data and it could be argued that presenting rounded data to a non­
statistician is problematic since the data have been visibly adjusted.
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The idea of rounding is that the original data are replaced by a multiple of a given 
rounding base. The choice of rounding base will usually depend on many factors 
such as spread of the data, the size of the data or the information contained in the 
table. There are many different forms of rounding and the choice of which form of 
rounding to use is very important. Unsophisticated and ill-informed rounding can 
result in the table losing its additivity. Additivity in a table is preferable wherever 
possible since most users find it simpler to understand and accept and also makes it 
much more difficult for an intruder to ‘unpick’ cell contents. Therefore it is important 
that a sensible rounding technique is used. It is also important that the rounding 
technique used is not revealed since a well-informed intruder using powerful software 
could use this information to make inferences about the data in the table. This section 
will look at the workings of some of the available rounding techniques and look at the 
protection they provide to tabular data.
As with adding noise one of the major advantages of rounding is that no cells are 
suppressed. In general the public or end user will prefer to have values in all the cells 
of the table as this appears much more complete. In general rounding is a relatively 
simple operation where the only choice required by the statistician is the size of the 
rounding base.
The major disadvantage of rounding is that a table which has been rounded gives the 
impression of being crudely and obviously adjusted. Even a casual observer will 
notice that every value has been rounded to a certain base and end users tend to feel 
uncomfortable with this. Also a disadvantage of both conventional and random
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rounding is that additivity is not retained in the table which causes problems for the 
end users as outlined above in the adding noise section. A further disadvantage with 
rounding is that for the table to be protected every cell must be rounded. This means 
that even many of the cells which contain no disclosure risk will be adjusted resulting 
in a loss of data utility.
2.2.1.3 Conventional Rounding
Conventional rounding is the simplest rounding technique. It is rarely used in practice 
and is included here simply to illustrate the general idea of rounding. To carry out 
conventional rounding the value in each cell in the table is rounded to the nearest 
multiple of the rounding base. An example of conventional rounding is given below:
Suppose the rounding base is 5 and the original table is table 2.1.3. Using the 
conventional rounding technique the rounded table would become table 2.2.2.
Variable 2
E F G H Total
A 25 5 35 20 80
B 0 15 10 120 145
Variable C 55 45 10 5 110
1 D 20 15 20 10 65
Total 95 75 80 150 405
Table 2.2.2: Conventional rounding applied to Table 2.1.3.
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As can be seen the table is not additive. As mentioned conventional rounding is 
rarely the preferred rounding technique of most statisticians due to both the loss of 
additivity and the fact that little protection is offered. Conventional rounding does 
however result in little information loss since all values are rounded to the nearest 
multiple.
2.2.1.4 Random Rounding
Random rounding is another form of rounding that can be used to protect the table 
against potential disclosure. The method behind random rounding is that each cell 
value that is not a multiple of the rounding base is rounded up, to the nearest multiple 
of the base, with probability p  and rounded down, to the nearest multiple of the base, 
with probability 1 - p .  All cells which are multiples of the rounding base stay the 
saifie and p  remains constant for all the cells in the table.
One variant of random rounding is unbiased random rounding. The procedure is 
unbiased since the expectation of each cell is equal to the original value of the cell. 
This is achieved by making the probability of rounding up or down dependent on the 
value of the cell. An example of how this works with a rounding base 5 is given in 
table 2.2.3.
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Original Value Rounded Value Probability
5 5 1
6 5 4/5
10 1/5
7 5 3/5
10 2/5
9 5 1/5
10 4/5
Table 2.2.3: Random Rounding Probabilities 
for base 5.
It is clear that the values in the table lead to an unbiased procedure. For example the
= 4 + 2 = 6(c
r n5 x — + lOxI 5j V 5,expected rounded value for a cell with original value 6 is 
i.e. the expected rounded value is the same as the original value.
Random rounding offers more protection against disclosure than conventional 
rounding due to the ambiguity created by the fact each cell can be rounded either up 
or down in a random fashion. Random rounding does however cause information loss 
that is both greater than conventional rounding and harder to control. An example of 
how random rounding may work on table 2.1.3 is given in table 2.2.4.
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V ariab le  2
E F G H Total
A 25 5 40 15 80
B 5 15 15 120 150
V ariab le C 55 40 5 5 110
1 D 20 15 25 10 65
Total 100 80 80 150 400
Table 2.2.4: Random rounding applied to Table 2.1.3.
It is clear that whilst random rounding has resulted in table 2.2.4 being protected from 
potential disclosure the table is not additive which is undesirable to both the 
statistician and the casual observer. However the protection offered here is far greater 
than in the conventional rounding technique since there is doubt as to whether each 
cell has been ‘rounded up’ or ‘rounded down’.
2.2.1.5 Controlled Rounding
Controlled rounding is a very powerful, widely used technique for protecting tabular 
data from potential disclosure. It is slightly more complex than both conventional 
rounding and random rounding. It is said that a table has been controlled rounded if:
1. for every value in the cell, the rounded value is the largest multiple of the base 
that is smaller than the original value or the rounded value is the smallest 
multiple of the base that is larger than the original value (i.e. rounded to an 
adjacent multiple of the base)
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2. the rounded table is additive
The procedure used to carry out controlled rounding will be illustrated here using the 
notation used by Willenborg and de Waal [34].
Suppose there is a cell value x and the value of the rounding base is b . Then x can 
be written as
x = kb + r, 0 < r < b (6)
where r is the remainder after dividing x by b and k is the whole number given
when dividing x by b . For example if x = 7 and b =5 then k would be equal to 1
and r would be equal to 2.
A rounding variable, </>(r) say, must then be created. </>(r)=b (with probability p  
say) if x is rounded to the smallest multiple of the base larger than itself. </){r) = 0 
(with probability 1 -  p  say) if x is rounded to the largest multiple of the base smaller 
than itself. Now let [x] be the randomly rounded cell value, [x] can be written as
[x]=kb + 0(r) (7)
The expected value of [x] is then
E([x]) =  kb + pb (8)
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The value of p  can be chosen by the statistician but it is important to note that for the
process to be unbiased p  must be equal to — giving £(Jx]) = x .
b
This procedure is carried out for all the cells in the table to give the completed 
randomly rounded table. Controlled rounding is the most effective of the three 
rounding procedures outlined in this section since it both preserves additivity and the 
randomness of the rounding offers strong protection against disclosure. Dr. J. J. 
Salazar-Gonzalez developed a Controlled Rounding Program for the ONS which, as 
Lowthian and Merola [40] write, was ‘based on sophisticated optimization techniques 
and computes solutions by the following criteria:
a) each rounded value is a multiple of the base adjacent to the original value;
b) the rounded values, yi, must satisfy given constraints defined as lb -s yt <; y~
and ub y. y *;
c) the rounded table, y, satisfies My=0;
d) if more than one solution satisfying a) and b) exists, the solution chosen is the 
one that minimizes the distance function: S(a, y ) = ^  & wj \at -  y t | , where the
w^s are given weights.
Where a is such vector, then the additive structure of the table can be represented by 
the equation:
Ma=0,
where M is a matrix of coefficients (0,1 or -1) that describe the additive relationships 
among the cells of the table.’
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An example of how controlled rounding would work on table 2.1.3 with a rounding 
base of 5 is given in table2.2.5.
Variable 2
E F G H Total
A 25 5 35 15 80
B 0 15 10 120 145
Variable C 55 40 10 5 110
1 D 20 15 25 10 70
Total 100 75 80 150 405
Table 2.2.5: Controlled rounding applied to Table 2.1.3.
Table 2.2.5 has now been protected against potential disclosure due to the uncertainty 
created by the rounding of the cells. This illustrates an advantage of controlled 
rounding which is that the table retains additivity. Furthermore when either controlled 
rounding or random rounding are used the process can be designed to ensure the 
rounded value of the cell is unbiased. The advantages of controlled rounding in 
particular are that a complete, additive and unbiased table is produced.
2.2.2 Non-Perturbative Techniques
As with perturbative statistical disclosure control techniques, the aim behind non- 
perturbative statistical disclosure control techniques is to reduce the potential risk of 
an intruder being able to obtain data on an individual subject whilst retaining the
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utility of the data. The major difference between perturbative and non perturbative 
techniques is that whilst perturbative techniques adjust the data to reduce the risk of 
disclosure, non perturbative techniques suppress some of the data to reduce the risk of 
disclosure. An advantage of this is that the tables produced are based solely on the 
raw data collected. This means that the statistician does not have to explain why the 
data can be adjusted whilst still producing sound statistical results. On the other hand 
a suppressed cell in a table will both arouse suspicion about that table and potentially 
give the table a sense of incompleteness. These and further advantages and 
disadvantages will be discussed throughout this section. Two of the most common 
non-perturbative techniques are table redesign and cell suppression.
2.2.2.1 Table Redesign
.When the table that is to be protected has many sensitive cells it is often useful to 
redesign the table. That is variables should be grouped together so as to increase the 
number of subjects in each cell. There are no specific statistical rules for redesigning 
a table and this is done using intuitively sensible variable groupings. Table redesign 
requires certain categories of variables which can be combined sensibly, if this is not 
the case table redesign is a very difficult technique to carry out and may ultimately 
result in useless tables being produced. It may also be the case that table redesign 
does not remove all the potential disclosure in the table and further disclosure control 
techniques may be required to protect the redesigned table from potential dislcosure.
A simple fabricated example of table redesign is found in table 2.2.6 where the data in 
cells for 17-24 and 25-35 year olds is considered (after formal testing) sensitive.
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Disease 
Age G roups.
No Yes Total
0-16 72 12 84
17-24 75 3 78
25-35 89 1 90
Total 236 16 252
Table 2.2.6: Fabricated example o f Disease Status by Age Group.
The potential disclosure in this table could possibly be avoided by combining age 
groups 17-24 and 25-35. This combination of groups makes intuitive sense since the 
new groups could now represent children (0-16) and young adults (17-35). This table 
redesign would give a new table (table 2.2.7).
Disease 
Age G roup \^^
No Yes Total
0-16 72 12 84
17-35 164 4 168
Total 236 16 252
Table 2.2.7: Table redesign applied to Table 2.2.6.
Formal tests of potential disclosure risk would be carried out on the redesigned table 
and if required further disclosure control techniques could be carried out on the 
redesigned table. Not all tables will be as simple to redesign although in many cases 
groups can be combined in effective and sensible ways to reduce the necessity of the 
use of other disclosure control techniques (such as suppression and rounding).
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The major advantage of table redesign is that none of the data are adjusted or 
suppressed so therefore none of the data utility is lost. Redesigning the table is 
generally regarded as the most efficient form of disclosure control provided the rows 
and/or columns fall into sensible groups. Another advantage of table redesign is that 
when the table is redesigned it is often the case that the table is made simpler and 
more user friendly. Clearly any row or column which is required by the end user 
cannot be collapsed into a redesigned row/column.
There is however a major disadvantage in table redesign which is that in many cases 
there are no natural groupings for the rows/columns to be collapsed into. This results 
in the method being unavailable or in a worse scenario a statistician attempting to 
combine rows/columns which should not intuitively be combined. Table redesign is a 
very effective method but should only be used in situations where there are intuitive 
groupings.
Table Redesign is available in Tau-Argus under the term Recoding. Recoding is often 
useful in protecting a table against disclosure since collapsed cells usually contain 
more contributors therefore reducing the risk of disclosure. There are two types of 
recoding; Hierarchical Recoding and Non-Hierarchical Recoding. If the variable to 
be recoded is a hierarchical variable Tau-Argus shows a hierarchical tree in the recode 
section. Consider the example, from the Tau-Argus manual, where there is data for 
12 regions (1-12) in four geographical areas (Nr, Os, Ws, Zd) where regions 1,2,3 are 
in area Nr, regions 4,5,6,7 are in area Os, regions 8,9,10 are in area Ws and regions
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11,12 are in area Zd. If this geographical hierarchical variable were to be recoded the 
hierarchical tree in Tau-Argus would be in the form offigure 2.2.1.
Figure 2.2.1: Hierarchical 
tree as would appear in 
Tau-Argus
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To collapse the cells the user selects the box next to the area. For example if the 
user wanted to collapse the cells for all the regions into the geographical areas the 
boxes next to each of the four areas would be selected leaving the hierarchical tree in 
the form given in figure 2.2.2.
Figure 2.2.2: Hierarchical 
tree with collapsed cells as 
would appear in Tau-Argus
Alternatively if the user wanted to open the area to include cells on regions the *+’ 
box is selected. Once the user has selected the form of recoding in which they wish 
the data to appear the Apply option and then the Close option is selected to 
incorporate these changes in the table.
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A ws
EB 2 d  
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If the variable to be recoded is non-hierarchical, the user is required to enter the 
recoding into Tau-Argus. To illustrate how the recode is entered considered an 
example where there are data for children aged 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18. It 
may be sensible to recode these in to three groups; Group 1 containing 10,11,12 year 
olds, Group 2 containing 13,14,15 year olds and Group 3 containing 16,17,18 year 
olds. In the ‘Edit box for global recode’ this would be entered in the form;
1:10-12
2:13-15
1:16-18
12.2.2 Cell Suppression
Cell suppression is a more complex but more powerful non-perturbative technique 
tian table redesign. The idea behind cell suppression is that any cell in the table that 
is sensitive is not published (in practice the cell value in the table is usually replaced 
ty a symbol, + say). These suppressions are called primary suppressions. Usually the 
primary suppressions alone do not provide sufficient protection against potential 
disclosure. Consider that table 2.1.3 has been tested for potential disclosure using a 
minimum frequency test with n = 3 and cell suppression will be used to protect the 
table. The primary suppressions would result in the table being of the form of table 
2.2.8 .
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Variable 2
E F G H Total
A 23 + 37 18 81
B + 15 12 119 147
Variable C 54 43 8 4 109
1 D 19 16 22 10 67
Total 97 77 79 151 404
Table 2.2.8: Primary suppressions removedfrom Table 2.1.3.
Ii is obvious that table 2.2.8 offers no protection to the suppressed cell. The number 
of subjects in group A for variable 1 and group F for variable 2 is clearly 3. This can 
be deduced using the other cell values and the marginals. Removing the marginals 
would significantly increase the protection offered by the table but often (and this will 
be assumed in this section) the user requires the marginal values to be retained in the 
published tables.
This shows that primary suppressions are not sufficient to protect a table against 
potential disclosure therefore further non-sensitive cells must be suppressed to protect 
the table. These further suppressions are called secondary suppressions. The choice 
of secondary suppressions should be such that the value of the cell that is subject to 
the primary suppression cannot be computed exactly. Unfortunately, as Evans et.al. 
[41] write, ‘While the concepts behind determining whether a particular cell is a 
disclosure risk are relatively simple, the process of choosing complementary 
suppressions to protect these sensitive cells is very complicated. The methodology by 
which complementary suppressions are chosen, as well as the accompanying
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computer software, is very difficult to understand for anyone without a background in 
linear programming.’ For a table to have sufficient protection from potential 
disclosure there must be either no suppressions or at least two suppressions in each 
row and column. It will be possible however for a range of potential values for the 
suppressed cell to be calculated. An example of how secondary suppressions could be 
used on table 2.2.8 is given in table 2.2.9.
Variable 2
E F G H Total
A 23 + + 18 81
B + 15 + 119 147
Variable C 54 43 8 4 109
1 D + + 22 10 67
Total 97 77 79 151 404
Table 2.2.9: Secondary suppressions removedfrom Table 2.2.8.
In table 2.2.9 it is not possible to compute the exact value for any of the cells. Often 
tables are much larger than the example given and when there is a large table with a 
number of primary suppressions the choice of secondary suppressions becomes 
relatively complex. In this scenario the aim of the secondary suppressions is to 
sufficiently protect the primary suppression whilst limiting the information loss 
caused by carrying them out. Willenborg and de Waal [16] suggest that there are 
three important aspects to secondary cell suppression;
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a. The sensitive cells should be adequately protected by the choice of the 
secondary suppressions; the ranges in which the values of the suppressed cells 
lie, should not be too narrow. It should be borne in mind that calculating 
ranges is possible when the values of the cells are restricted in some way, e.g. 
by a requirement that they be nonnegative.
b. The loss of information due to the secondary suppressions should be 
minimized.
c. No zero-valued cells or empty cells should be suppressed.’
The choice of secondary suppression affects the size of the range of values in which it 
is known the suppressed cell lies. This range of values is known as a feasibility 
interval and can be constructed using linear equations of the marginals and the 
remaining cell values. This can be done for small tables by hand or by using 
computing software for larger more complex tables. The statistician must decide 
before the suppression how large the feasibility interval should be to offer sufficient 
protection and then ensure that the suppression carried out has provided this 
protection.
The justification behind not suppressing empty cells is that in many cases empty cells 
will be known to be empty before publication of the data e.g. in the brain surgery 
example if one of the procedures was some form of brain surgery and a hospital did 
not have facilities to carry out that operation it would be known that this cell will be 
empty. Suppressing an empty cell would not aid disclosure in this case since the prior 
knowledge combined with the values in the marginals and non-suppressed cells may 
result in disclosure of the value of the primary suppressed cell.
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The aim of the secondary suppressions is to sufficiently protect the primary 
suppression whilst limiting the information loss. To quantify the information loss 
each cell must be given a weight. There are many ways to assign weights (in fact any 
sensible system is acceptable) to the cells in the table and the choice of weights can 
often be dependent on the aim of the study or the nature of the data. The idea of these 
weights is to target the damage so as to maintain the primary purpose of the output as 
much as possible, i.e. the intention is to concentrate the damage as far as possible on 
the ‘least useful’ data. This often means the cells containing the lower frequencies. 
Three potential choices of weights are:
1. Weights to minimize the total number of cells suppressed. Here all cells are 
given the same weight i.e. = c where c > 0.
2. Weights to minimize the value of the suppressed cells. Here the weight of the 
cells is equal to the value of the cell.
3. Weights to minimize the number of respondents suppressed. Here the weight 
of the cell is the same as the number of subjects that contributed to the cell.
Clearly the second choice of weights would only be applicable if the table contained 
magnitude data and not possible if the table contained frequency data showing how 
the choice of weights should depend on the nature of the data.
Cell Suppression is an extremely popular technique for protecting tables against 
potential disclosure. The major advantage of cell suppression as a dislcosure control 
technique is that since some of the cells are suppressed there is no need to perturb the
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values in the table. This means that all the information provided in the table is 
accurate which is helpful for any end user that wishes to use the information to run 
further statistical tests. A further advantage is that the marginals are retained in their 
original form in the table (assuming they are protected from secondary suppressions) 
which is often helpful to the end user. This form of suppression is not difficult to 
explain to a non-statistical minded end user since only sensitive cells are suppressed 
and none of the values are adjusted.
In spite of the popularity of cell suppression as a disclosure control technique there 
are certain disadvantages encountered when implementing it. A major disadvantage 
is that end users can often feel uncomfortable about cell values being suppressed in 
tables. This is because either: suppressed values may make the end user (particularly 
if the end user is the general public) feel that the statistical organisation is attempting 
to ‘hide* information or if the end user is attempting to carry out further analysis these 
suppressed values can cause serious problems. The issue of the end user feeling that 
the statistical organisation is attempting to ‘hide’ information is especially important 
due to the importance of public trust in the organisation. Another disadvantage of cell 
suppression is that since secondary suppressions are required to protect the marginals 
the information from the secondary suppressed cells is lost even though those cells are 
safe.
On a small table secondary cell suppression is not difficult and can often be simply 
calculated by hand however when the table becomes large and/or there are a large 
number of primary suppressions, the problem can become complex. The complexity 
arises from the fact that the potential number of combinations of secondary
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suppressions can become very large. There are many methods currently used to 
compute secondary suppressions. For large tables these methods often require a 
significant amount of computing power. Four of these methods are hypercube, 
modular, optimal and network.
1.2.23 Hypercube Approach
To attempt to simplify the secondary suppression problem, the hypercube method 
considers the primary suppressed cells consecutively. For each cell, a hypercube is 
chosen where the primary suppressed cell is one of the comer points. Once the 
iypercube is chosen all its comer points are suppressed and the suppressed cells are 
given a large negative weight. In the two-dimensional case that is mentioned in this 
section this hypercube is a rectangle. The rectangle is chosen so as to minimise the 
bss of information that is incurred by the suppression. The loss of information is 
quantified by the weights (as discussed above) that are assigned to the cells and the 
chosen hypercube (rectangle) is called the suppression hypercube. This procedure is 
carried out for all the primary suppressed cells. It is often the case that cells that have 
already been suppressed will be included in future hypercubes due to their large 
negative weight therefore hypercubes for different primary suppressed cells may 
contain some of the same cells.
Once all the hypercubes have been selected the width of the feasibility intervals of the 
primary suppressed cells must be calculated to ensure that they are sufficiently wide. 
There are two recognised techniques for dealing with this problem. One of these 
techniques involves carrying out the above procedure and when all the suppressions
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due to the hypercubes are completed, checking by means of a linear programming 
problem, whether all the feasibility intervals are sufficiently wide. A major 
disadvantage of this method is that if even one feasibility interval is too narrow the 
whole suppression pattern is rejected and it is then difficult to adjust this pattern 
resulting in a waste of time and resources.
The other recognised technique is to take into account the necessary width of the 
feasibility interval for each suppressed cell and include this in the decision of the 
suppression hypercube. This implies that the hypercube chosen as the suppression 
hypercube is the one that minimises the information loss whilst ensuring the 
feasibility interval is sufficiently wide. An example of this technique is a heuristic 
proposed by Repsilber [42]. Suppose there is a sensitive cell that has to be protected 
against disclosure and there is a proposed hypercube. Each comer point of the 
hypercube is either an even number or an odd number of steps from the sensitive cell. 
If the comer point is an even number of steps from the sensitive cell it is called an 
even comer point and if it is an odd number of steps from the sensitive cell it is called 
an odd comer point. Note:- the sensitive cell is an even comer point.
Suppose now that a value, s _, is subtracted from the sensitive cell. This implies that, 
in order to preserve additivity of the table, e_ must be added to all odd comer points 
and subtracted from all even comer points. Also, in order to preserve non-negativity, 
the minimum value of the even comer points is equal to the maximum value of s_. 
Conversely when a value, s  +, is added to the sensitive cell the minimum value of the 
odd comer points is equal to the maximum value of s+. Therefore an intruder can 
estimate the value of an even comer point to lie in the interval
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(xe -  max s_, xe + max £+)
where xe is the true value of the even comer point. The value of an odd comer point 
can be seen to lie in the interval
(xa -  max s+ ,xQ + max£_)
where x0 is the true value of the odd comer point. If the values max £_ and max£+
are large enough, i.e. the feasibility interval is sufficiently wide, then the proposed 
hypercube becomes a candidate suppression hypercube. The suppression hypercube 
should then be the candidate suppression hypercube that results in the least 
information loss. This technique should be carried out on all primary suppressed cells 
to produce a protected table. A major advantage of this is that complex linear 
programming problems are avoided, however it takes no account of cells that have 
already been suppressed in previous secondary suppressions. One of the limitations 
of the hypercube method is that, Massel [43] writes, it ‘often oversuppresses (estimate 
of 30%) and it may not find the best suppression pattern even for a single sensitive 
cell. This occurs because it is considering only the simplest types of suppression 
patterns.’
2,2.2 A Modular Approach
If a table contains a hierarchical variable any secondary suppressions might lead to 
more secondary suppressions being required in related tables. It has been suggested
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by Fischetti and Salazar Gonzalez [44] that adding additional constraints to a linear 
programming problem will allow tables from hierarchical variables and also linked 
tables to be protected. The problem with this is that when dealing with hierarchical 
variables the number of constraints grows rapidly due to the inter dependency of the 
many possible sub tables and sub totals. This results in the computing power and time 
required to carry out these calculations also increasing.
The modular (HiTaS) approach put forward by de Wolf [45] for secondary cell 
suppression is a heuristic approach used for suppressing hierarchical tables. This 
approach deals with a large set of sub-tables individually in a structured order to 
reduce the computation time. A potential problem with this method is that it produces 
a solution that minimises the information loss in the individual sub-tables but does not 
necessarily minimise the total information loss.
The modular approach uses a top-down approach to deal with the secondary 
suppressions. The first stage of the process is to identify the unsafe cells (i.e. the 
primary suppressions) in the base table which is produced by crossing the hierarchical 
variables. The secondary suppressions must now be calculated. The fact that 
hierarchical variables are being used means that the secondary suppressions must be 
chosen in such a way that different sub-tables cannot be combined to unpick the 
values of sub-tables further up the hierarchy. The basic idea of the approach is to 
firstly calculate the secondary suppressions for the highest-level table (i.e. the table 
with the highest level for all hierarchical variables). The interior cell values (whether 
suppressed or not) then become the marginal values in lower level tables. The 
process then moves down to the next level of tables below the highest level. The
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marginals (from the interior cell values of the highest level table) in these lower level 
tables stay fixed (or protected) and secondary suppressions are calculated for these 
tables. The secondary suppressions calculated here can be either to protect any of the 
inserted marginals which have been suppressed or any primary suppressions in the 
interior cells of the lower level table. This process is repeated until the lowest level 
table has been protected.
Since the secondary suppressions are restricted to interior cells, if there is a lower 
level table with several empty cells it may be the case that it is impossible to find a 
solution. In this scenario the process carries out the suppression on the table from the 
level above the problem table again with the suppression pattern from the lower level 
table considered i.e. the tables cannot be considered independently.
It is clear that the order in which the tables are suppressed is important. It is crucial 
that this order is planned out in advance. The process deals with this by defining 
tables into certain classes. To illustrate how this is done suppose there are two 
hierarchical explanatory variables each with three levels (0,1,2). The groups are 
defined by a crossing of the levels of the explanatory variables. The classes 
associated with these variables and the groups that would be members of each class 
are given in table 2.2.10.
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Class Groups
0 00
1 10,01
2 20, 11,02
3 21, 12
4 22
Table 2.2.10: How groups are defined into classes for the modular approach 
to secondary suppression.
De Wolf [46] writes ‘Defined in this way, marginals of the tables in class i have been 
dealt with as the interior of tables in a class j with j < i. As a result, each table in class 
i can be protected independently of the other tables in that particular class, whenever 
the tables in classes j with j < i have been dealt with.’
Clearly the number of tables in each group differs depending on the nature of the 
hierarchical variable. The number of tables in a group is in fact dependent on the 
number of ‘parent categories’ the variables have one level up in the hierarchy. The 
Tau-Argus user manual [35] notes ‘A parent category is defined as a category that has 
one or more sub-categories.’ For example suppose there is a hierarchical variable 
with three levels of the form given in figure 2.2.3.
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0 1 2
Figure 2.2.3: Illustration o f 
hierarchies in a geographical 
variable
District32
District31
District21
CountyC3
CountyCl
Region(R)
District23
District22CountyC2
In figure 2.2.3 level 1 has 1 parent category and level 2 has 2 parent categories. The 
number of tables in each group is equal to the product of the number of parent 
categories of each level.
2.2.2.5 Optimal Approach
The optimal approach to secondary cell suppression attempts to find optimal or at 
least near optimal solutions to the problem. The optimization models used have been 
developed for Tau-Argus by a team of researchers headed by Juan-Jose Salazar-
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Gonzalez of the University La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain. The approach according to 
the Tau-Argus user manual [35] ‘is based on a Mathematical Programming technique 
which consists of solving Integer Linear Programming programs modelling the 
combinatorial problems.’ The major characteristic in the model is that it is based on a 
0-1 variable for each cell where the value of the variable is 1 if the cell is to be 
suppressed and 0 if it is not to be suppressed. Therefore the number of variables in 
the model is the number of cells to be protected. Also included in the approach is a 
second model to ensure the safety ranges are maintained by the suppression. This 
model takes into account the fact that an intruder trying to compute the value of a 
sensitive cell will attempt to use two linear programming programmes (attacker 
problems) to calculate the suppressed values. The approach is called a branch-and-cut 
algorithm since the presence of the 0-1 variable makes a branching stage necessary.
According to the Tau-Argus user manual [35] ‘Branch-and-cut algorithms are modem 
techniques in Operations Research that provide excellent results when solving larger 
and complicated combinatorial problems arising in many applied fields. Shortly, the 
idea is to solve a compact 0-1 model containing a large number of linear inequalities 
through an iterative procedure that does not consider all the inequalities at the same 
time, but generates the important ones when needed.’ This allows large models to be 
split into a short sequence of small models.
Also important to the whole process is the pre-processing approach. This eliminates 
redundant equations defining the table, removes variables associated to non-relevant 
cells and detects dominated protection levels. This pre-processing is crucial to the 
process since it makes the problem as small as possible before the optimization stage.
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The heuristic routine also plays a key role in the approach. It allows the process to 
start with an upper bound for the optimal loss of information and different protected 
patterns are produced as the process runs so that if the process is stopped before 
optimality is proven a near optimal solution is given. The best solution is called an 
optimal solution if its loss of information is equal to the lower bound for optimal loss 
of information where ‘the lower bound is computed by solving a relaxed model, 
which consists of removing the integrability condition on the integer model.’
2.2.2.6 Network Approach
The Network approach to secondary cell suppression is used to suppress two- 
dimensional tables with one hierarchical variable. The heuristic for this approach 
computes a sequence of shortest-path sub problems to give a feasible solution to the 
problem which is hopefully close to the optimal solution.
The approach requires tables to be modelled as networks. To do this the procedure 
firstly lists all the possible tables in a hierarchical tree. The highest-level table is then 
extracted and a network created for it.
The original hierarchical network will be successively updated. This is done by an 
iterative procedure for each of the other lower level tables which extracts one table, 
creates its network and then updates the hierarchical network. When all the tables 
have been used to update the hierarchical network this network models the 
hierarchical table.
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Once the hierarchical network has been produced one iterative procedure is carried 
out for each primary suppression. If not already protected by the protection of 
previous primary suppressions the primary suppression is protected by setting the cost 
of arcs in the network. The arc is the path from one cell to another. Any arcs relating 
to cells which cannot be suppressed are given a very high cost. A shortest path is then 
from one end of the network to the other and is defined as the path which results in 
the least information loss. All cells in the shortest path will then become secondary 
suppressions. The procedure protects both the upper and lower protection bounds for 
each of the primary suppressions. These bounds are updated throughout the process, 
Domingo-Ferrer and Torra [47] writes that this is ‘to avoid the solution of 
unnecessary shortest-path subproblems for next primaries, we update not only the 
protection levels of p (primary suppression of interest in iteration), but also of all the 
primary cells in the shortest path’. Once all the iterations in the procedure have been 
carried out the table will be an adequate solution to the secondary suppression option 
and it is hoped the solution will be, whilst not exactly optimal, close to optimal.
Whilst this procedure has the advantage of being extremely fast computationally it has 
certain limitations. These include, according to Massel [43], ‘oversuppression is 
common for all cases but usually tolerable, limited types of cost functions can be 
expressed’ and undersuppression can occur for hierarchies with more than 2 levels.
Cell Suppression is one of the major tools used by Tau-Argus. All the secondary 
suppression methods mentioned above are available although clearly since some 
methods relate to certain types of data they can only be used for certain data sets. 
Tau-Argus also allows the user to manually decide which cells are suppressed. In the
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program the user can view the status of the cell. The status of the cell can be any of 
the options given in table 2.2.11.
Status Definition of Status
Safe Does not violate the safety rule
Safe (from manual) Manually made safe during the session
Unsafe According to the safety rule
Unsafe (request) Unsafe according to the Request rule
Unsafe (frequency) Unsafe according to the minimum frequency rule
Unsafe (singleton) Unsafe due to singleton suppression
Unsafe
(singleton)(manual)
Unsafe due to singleton suppression but primary suppression 
carried out manually
Unsafe (from manual) Manually made unsafe during this session
Protected Cannot be selected as a candidate for secondary cell 
suppression
Secondary Cell selected for secondary suppression
Secondary (from 
manual)
Unsafe due to secondary suppressions after primary 
suppressions carried out manually*
Zero Value is zero and cannot be suppressed
Empty No records contributed to this cell and the cell cannot be 
suppressed
Table 2.2.11: Definitions o f the various statuses that cells can take in Tau-Argus.
There is an option in Tau-Argus for the user to change the status of the cell. The 
options are:
• Set to Safe: A cell which has failed the safety tests is still to be considered safe.
• Set to Unsafe: A cell which has passed the safety tests is to be considered unsafe.
• Set to Protected: A safe cell that is not to be considered for secondary suppression.
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These options can be extremely useful in circumstances where the user needs to 
publish data on certain sections of the table. For example there may be a number of 
tables on aborted pregnancies for different age groups across different areas where the 
primary subject of interest is abortions in middle-aged women. It may be the case that 
there are many unsafe cells for abortions in teenage pregnancies in certain areas and 
that for these to be suppressed the secondary suppressions may remove some of the 
data from abortions in middle aged women. By setting the cells of primary interest as 
Protected this problem would be removed.
2.23 Summary of Techniques Used to Remove Potential Disclosure in Tabular 
Data
The techniques which have been described to protect against potential disclosure in 
tabular data are summarised in table 2.2.12.
Technique Variants Parameters
Rounding Conventional Rounding 
Random Rounding 
Controlled Rounding
b - rounding base
Adding Noise Additive Noise 
Multiplicative Noise
e - non-biased random variable
Cell Suppression None secondary suppression technique
Table Redesign None variables to be grouped
Table 2.1.12: Summary of Disclosure Removal Techniques. Techniques available in 
Tau Argus are shown in italics.
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2.3 Quantifying Information Loss
The aim of statistical disclosure control is to produce a table that is free from (or at 
least has a very small probability of) potential disclosure risk. However whilst the 
table must be protected it is important that as much information as possible is retained 
by the table. Therefore to examine the performance of a particular disclosure control 
technique on a table of data the information loss must be quantified. To do this each 
cell must firstly be given a weight. As in section 2.2.2 three potential weights for 
cells are:
1. Unity -  Each cell has a weight of 1.
2. Frequency -  The weight of each cell is the number of contributors to that cell.
3. Variable -  The weight of each cell is the total value of the variable in the cell. 
This can only be used if the table contains magnitude data.
Cells can be weighted using other techniques if the user requires a certain style of 
weighting although this is unusual.
Each method of disclosure control requires slightly different techniques to quantify 
the information loss in the table:
1. Cell Suppression -  The information loss is the total of the weight values of all 
the suppressed cells.
2. Rounding -  The information loss for each individual cell is w\x -  y\ where w 
is the weight of the cell, x is the original value and y  is the rounded value.
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Then the overall information loss is the sum of the information loss over all 
the cells.
3. Adding Noise -  The information loss is calculated in exactly the same way as 
for Rounding with y  the value with noise added.
4. Table Redesign -  The information loss is the sum of all the weights of the 
collapsed columns and/or rows.
The disclosure method chosen will usually be the one that minimises information loss 
although this may not always be the case. There may be situations where the user 
wishes to use a certain method of disclosure control. For example suppression may 
result in the smallest information loss but the user may not want suppressed cells in 
the table. Also it is often the case that tables have more categories than is necessary, 
e.g. having individual ages rather than age groups, and although table redesign may 
result in a fair amount of information loss it is information that is not crucial to the 
user that is lost therefore table redesign may be preferable. In general though the 
most effective disclosure control method is the one which results in the least 
information loss.
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3. Selection of Statistical Disclosure Control Method
3.1 Practical Issues in Deciding Between Disclosure Methods
As has been shown statistical disclosure control has both scientific and social 
influences. If the problem were purely statistical it would be relatively simple to 
quantify the information loss produced by each disclosure control method and select 
ihe method which results in the least information loss. However there are often other 
practical issues which must be taken into account when the table is protected. These 
practical issues often require the statistician to subjectively investigate the data before 
they proceed with the disclosure control and to liaise with both the provider of the 
data and the end user of the data. This communication between the statistician and 
the data user is essential as the statistician will not only receive an idea of what the 
user requires from the data but may gain extra background information on the data.
The most subjective stage of statistical disclosure control is the decision on whether a 
cell contains a potential disclosure risk. It is at this stage that the statistician must 
take the most care over how much control is given to the user regarding the test used 
to detect potential disclosure. The reason for this is two fold. Firstly if there is any 
breach of confidentiality the responsibility ultimately lies with the statistician and 
their organisation and such a breach may result in future lack of trust in the statistical 
organisation or possibly even legal action. Secondly the end user may appear to be 
credible and well intentioned however it may be that they are trying to expose 
information on an individual and if they have too much knowledge of the safety test it 
may make it possible for the disclosure control method to be ‘unpicked’. However,
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useful information can still be gathered from the end user to assist in the process of 
discovering potential disclosure risks. For example if the statistician has decided on a 
minimum frequency rule it may be possible to learn from the end user (if they are an 
expert in the field) how many subjects would likely be required to reduce the 
disclosure risk to a reasonable level. Also if the statistician wished to use the P% test 
it might be useful to learn the perceived possibility of coalitions being formed by 
subjects in the table. It is important in these circumstances for the statistician to 
consult with the end user whilst retaining control over the decisions regarding 
letecting potential disclosure risk.
The statistical disclosure control technique which often provides the most useful 
Jesuits to the end user is table redesign. It is often the case that a redesigned table can 
still contain all the information required by the end user while removing the 
potentially disclosive aspects of the data. In many cases data are gathered in great 
detail and while this is often necessary for studies into exact conditions it may be the 
case that another study on the same data does not require such detail and can be 
simplified. For example there may be a large amount of data on a condition for 
subjects of every age. One study may be concentrating on children and therefore 
requires the data split up by year whereas a larger study on the population as a whole 
may not require individual years of age therefore age groups may provide less 
disclosive but equally useful data. The application of table redesign has many 
practical issues. The statistician needs to be aware of how detailed or otherwise the 
end users requires each variable to be or whether the user requires a certain level of a 
variable to remain and not be merged with other levels. Another important aspect of 
table redesign is that the table will only retain its usefulness if levels of the variable
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can be sensibly merged. For example if there is a condition which is prevalent in 
adults but not so in children or the elderly it does not make sense to protect the table 
against potential disclosure by merging the data for children and the elderly. In this 
example it is obvious to even the casual observer that this redesign is flawed however 
for more complex and specialised data it may not be so clear. In these situations the 
statistician is required to communicate with an expert (preferably the end user) to 
gather information on potential groupings.
One of the major differences between the disclosure control methods is the 
appearance of the final table. In many situations the end user will have a preference 
as to how the table is set out. One of the major decisions to be made is whether the 
end user prefers a table which has the values in each cell perturbed but is complete or 
whether they would rather a table which has some cells suppressed but has the 
original data in the other cells. There are many factors which may affect this choice. 
For example if the cell values were on the whole large except for a few entries it may 
be preferable to use rounding since the rounding may not have such a relative effect 
on the final results. On the other hand the table may contain cells which are not of 
primary interest to the final user but are found in the data. In some circumstances 
these cells may be suppressed (as either primary or secondary suppressions) to reduce 
the disclosure risk to a safe level without affecting the cells of interest. Again the 
importance of communication between statistician and the end user is essential to 
ensure a solution is reached which is mutually satisfactory. This choice can often be 
made by the end user, unfortunately there are occasions when certain disclosure 
control techniques (in particular cell suppression) are unavailable and the statistician
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may have to insist a certain technique is used to avoid releasing potentially disclosive 
data.
It is clear that it is helpful to the statistician to have input from the end user in the 
statistical disclosure control process. The end user can often supply useful 
information to the statistician to assist in the disclosure control process. It is the job 
of the statistician to provide the information that is of most use to the end user and 
consultations between the two parties is crucial for this. It is important to remember 
however that the statistician should ensure that there is an acceptably low risk of 
disclosure. This may in some cases result in the user being unaware of certain 
techniques which have been used in the process or techniques being used against the 
end user’s wishes. This is unfortunate but the statistician should always err on the 
side of ensuring low disclosure risk ahead of high data utility. Further the statistician 
should always endeavour to communicate with an expert in the field, even when the 
end user is unavailable/unhelpful, to assist with the practical aspects of statistical 
disclosure control.
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3.2 Flow Chart for Determining Statistical 
Disclosure Control Method
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3.3 Formal Discussion of Disclosure Control Flow Chart
The process of statistical disclosure control is a rather complex process with many 
user choices. In both the attempt to detect any disclosure risk in the data and the 
process of protecting against any such disclosure the statistician must make choices 
between a variety of techniques and the parameters associated to these techniques. 
These choices can significantly affect the construction of tables of protected data and 
it is important that the methods are planned in advance. A major advantage of the 
reduced computation time and large number of user options offered by the Tau-Argus 
program is that a number of disclosure control methods can be attempted on unsafe 
data to investigate the information loss due to each method. Section 3.2 contains a 
flow chart for determining the statistical disclosure control process which will be 
implemented on the data. This flow chart was produced at the request of ISD as an 
aide to allow staff to be trained in the techniques of statistical disclosure control since 
this is not an area covered in an undergraduate degree in statistics. This section will 
briefly discuss the choices to be made at each stage of the flow chart and discuss their 
implications.
33.1 Type of Data
Before even starting the process of disclosure control it is important that the 
statistician is aware of the composition of the data being used and what the particular 
use of the final table is. The data must be subjectively investigated to provide the 
statistician with an overview of such things as potential groupings and the size of 
magnitude data. It is also useful for the statistician to spend some time getting a
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general ‘feel’ for the data. At this stage the user must know the important information 
that should be retained, if at all possible, in the safe table. This knowledge allows the 
statistician to make decisions later in the process that allow this information to be 
retained.
As mentioned in section 1.4 an important distinction that must be made is one 
between frequency data and magnitude data. This distinction must be made since the 
different types of data correspond to different tests for disclosure risk.
33.2 Test for Disclosure Risk
Of all the decisions in the statistical disclosure control the choice of safety test is 
probably the most important. Without properly testing for potential disclosure there is 
a risk that tables are produced that carry potential disclosure about an individual 
subject and therefore the potential for harm to the individual subject. In a simplistic 
world, as long as tests for disclosure risk were carried out, it would be possible to 
avoid any disclosure by not publishing any table that carries any risk. This is clearly 
not practical due to the need society has for the information, hence the disclosure 
control methods outlined in this project, but it shows the importance this stage has in 
protecting individual subjects.
The flow chart shows that when the data being protected are magnitude data there are 
4 potential safety tests which can be selected. These are; the dominance rule, the p% 
test, the p,q% test and the minimum frequency test. An overview of the theory and 
practicalities of these tests is given in section 2.1.2. Either one or a combination of all
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of these tests can be used to discover the cells in the table which contain a potential 
disclosure risk. It is often beneficial to use a combination of the tests to improve the 
protection given in the table. For example the minimum frequency test can be used in 
conjunction with any of the other tests to ensure there are no cells with few subjects 
contained and also that the magnitude values given by the subjects do not pose a 
potential disclosure risk.
The flow chart shows that when a table containing frequency data is being protected 
there are 2 potential safety tests which can be selected. These are; the p% sensitive 
cell test, the across test and the minimum frequency test. An overview of the theory 
and practicalities of these tests is given in section 2.1.1. These tests should be used 
individually and often the minimum frequency test is the preferred option due to the 
simplicity of the test.
Once the safety test has been selected the parameters for the required test must be 
selected. The choice of these parameters is crucial to the protection given by the 
safety rule. The flow chart shows the parameters which must be chosen for each of 
the tests. The choice of parameters is discussed in section 3.4.
33 3  Identify Unsafe Cells
Once the test for disclosure risk and the associated parameters have been chosen the 
process can identify the unsafe cells. These cells now have to be adjusted and/or 
suppressed in some way to ensure the final table is free of disclosure risk and safe for 
dissemination. In some circumstances the statistician will be able to set an unsafe cell
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to safe since either they believe the issue to not be sensitive enough to require 
disclosure control or the cell will be retained at the expense of another (or other) 
cell(s). There are many techniques that can be used to protect the table and the choice 
of these is the next stage in the disclosure control.
33.4 Style of Disclosure Control
Once the unsafe cells have been discovered the statistician must decide on a style of 
disclosure control. As the flow chart shows all disclosure control techniques fall into 
two separate groups regarding the style of the disclosure control. These are:
• Perturbative techniques -  the data are adjusted in some way to provide 
uncertainty to the true value of each cell.
• Non-perturbative techniques - the data are not adjusted but often some cells or 
groups are not published and are hidden from public view.
The choice of the style of disclosure control is an extremely important stage in the 
process. An important consideration to make is who the end user of the data is. Some 
end users may prefer to have a table that is complete but has all the cells adjusted 
whereas other users may prefer less detail in the table as long as the original values 
are used. The decision should be made by the statistician with input from the end user 
to ensure that they are satisfied with the final table provided. Methods from both 
styles of disclosure control are available in Tau-Argus.
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33,5 Method of Disclosure Control
Once the style of disclosure control has been chosen the statistician must choose a 
method of disclosure from the available methods from that style. Both styles have a 
variety of methods from which the final one can be chosen. The choice of method of 
disclosure control determines how the final table is produced. The differences can be 
relatively significant and affect potential further study making the choice of method 
crucial.
The flow chart shows that if perturbative techniques are to be used there are two main 
methods for disclosure control: adding noise and rounding. Rounding is the most 
commonly used perturbative disclosure control technique. Rounding is the only 
perturbative technique available in Tau-Argus. Another perturbative technique that is 
not as popular as rounding, and therefore not available in Tau-Argus, is adding noise 
to the data. An overview of the theory and practicalities of both methods is given in 
section 2.2.1.
The flow chart shows that if non-perturbative techniques are to be used there are two 
main methods for disclosure control: cell suppression and table redesign. Table 
redesign is usually preferable and should be used whenever possible however it is not 
always a sensible option so cannot always be used. Cell suppression on the other 
h;and is almost always possible and is the most commonly used non-perturbative 
technique. Both methods are available in Tau-Argus. An overview of the theory and 
practicalities of both methods is given in section 2.2.2.
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3.3.6 Form of Disclosure Control
Once the method of disclosure control has been selected the statistician must make a 
decision on the form the disclosure control method will take. Each method of 
disclosure control can take a different form depending on the choice made by the 
statistician. This choice can in fact significantly affect the make up of the protected 
table with the different forms of disclosure working in different ways. Once again the 
form of disclosure control chosen is dependent on the data but is also dependent on 
which method the statistician finds more effective and/or user friendly. Consultation 
with the end user can again be useful at this stage.
The flow chart shows that if adding noise has been chosen as the method of disclosure 
control there are two potential forms of the method which can be used: additive noise 
or multiplicative noise. Clearly the difference between these two forms is quite large. 
A major difference (and in fact a disadvantage of additive noise) is that when additive 
noise is used it is difficult to retain the additivity of the table whereas when 
multiplicative noise is used an iterated proportional fitting (IPF) method can be used 
to retain additivity. However additive noise is simpler to apply and in many cases 
results in less information loss so is often the preferred form. Once the form of noise 
has been decided a random variable must also be chosen. Any sensible unbiased 
random variable, with a variance chosen according to the data, can be selected 
according to the wishes of the statistician.
The flow chart shows that if rounding has been chosen as the method of disclosure 
control there are three potential forms of the method which can be used: conventional
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rounding, random rounding or controlled rounding. All three forms of rounding offer 
various advantages and disadvantages and should be used accordingly. Conventional 
rounding is rarely used since it offers little protection to the data. Controlled rounding 
is often chosen over random rounding since it offers good protection to the data whilst 
retaining additivity in the table (an advantage that no other rounding achieves). Once 
the form of rounding has been decided a rounding base must be chosen. This 
rounding base can be any sensible base according to the size of the data.
If cell suppression has been chosen as the method of disclosure controlled the 
statistician must choose between the four possible secondary suppression techniques. 
The flow chart shows that these are: hypercube, modular, network or optimal. The 
choice of secondary suppression technique is not simply determined by the 
statistician’s preference since individual methods are necessary for certain data types. 
The hypercube and optimal secondary suppression techniques can be used on most 
forms of data and the hypercube method is the most commonly used however, as the 
name suggests, the optimal technique can in some cases give a slightly improved 
suppression but in large tables this may be time consuming and require large amounts 
of computing power. The modular secondary suppression technique is used on data 
which contains at least one hierarchical variable. The network secondary suppression 
technique is used on two-dimensional tables with one hierarchical dimension and is 
faster and requires less computing power than the modular technique. All four types 
of secondary cell suppression are available in Tau-Argus.
To allow secondary suppression to be carried out effectively all the cells need to have 
a value for the information loss of suppressing them. This information loss can be
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measured as weights for each cell. The way in which cells are weighted is the 
decision of the statistician with any sensible method acceptable. The flow chart 
shows three common methods of weighting cells are:
1. Weights to minimize the total number of cells suppressed. Here all cells are 
given the same weight i.e. wtj = c where c > 0.
2. Weights to minimize the value of the suppressed cells. Here the weight of the 
cells is equal to the value of the cell.
3. Weights to minimize the number of respondents suppressed. Here the weight 
of the cell is the same as the number of subjects that contributed to the cell.
3.4 Parameter Selection Protocol
The statistician must make a number of choices in the statistical disclosure control 
process. These choices are not restricted to deciding on which particular disclosure 
control method should be used. Once the statistician has decided on both a test for 
potential disclosure and a technique for removing any potential disclosure, a choice 
must be made regarding the parameters for each test. Of the many methods available 
almost all require some decisions to be made regarding the values used. These values 
can make a significant difference to the final table, affecting which cells are 
considered safe and also the final make up of the table. It is important for the 
statistician to study the data before selecting parameters since different sets of data 
will require different parameters to ensure the data are made safe for release.
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The selection of parameters in tests for detecting potential disclosure in a table is 
essential to ensure confidentiality is protected. If the parameters are too lenient there 
may be a risk of potentially disclosive information being released however if the 
parameters are too restrictive the released table will have lost a great deal of its data 
utility. Once again the process is a trade off between disclosure risk and data utility 
even down to the level of parameter selection. Each safety test requires different 
parameters to be selected. Table 3.4.1 shows the different parameter selections which 
are required for five of the common safety tests. As mentioned the selection of these 
parameter values is very subjective and the data themselves have a large bearing on 
the chosen values. Also consultation between the statistician and an expert should 
allow more accurate selection of parameters especially for parameters such as size of 
coalition and intruders prior knowledge of other subjects. If the statistician is in any 
doubt over the selection of a parameter they should always select a parameter which 
they are sure will provide adequate disclosure protection.
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Method Data Used On Parameters Frequently 
Chosen Values
Dominance
Rule
Magnitude n -  number of contributors 
k -  percentage contributed
n -2 ,3  
k - 70,75
P% Test 
(across and 
within cell test)
Magnitude p -  accuracy of estimation 
n -  size of coalition
p -10,15 
n - 1  (no 
coalition), 2
P,Q% Test Magnitude p -  accuracy of estimation 
q -  accuracy of intruder prior 
knowledge of other subjects 
n -  size of coalition
p - 10,15 
q - 10,15 
n - 1,2
Minimum
Frequency
Magnitude and 
Frequency
n -  minimum number of 
contributors
n -3 ,5
?% Sensitive 
Cell Test
Frequency p -  percentage of subjects in 
sensitive category
p -7 0 , 80
Across Cell 
Test
Frequency p -  accuracy of estimation 
c -  size of coalition
p - 3 0 ,40 
c - 1,2
• Table 3.4.1: Parameter selections required for various safety tests. Tests in 
italic are available in Tau-Argus and the default selections are given in bold.
Once the test to detect unsafe cells has been selected the statistician must select a 
technique to remove the disclosure risk from the table. As with the tests for detecting 
potential disclosure risk the techniques to remove disclosure risk require further 
selections of the style of each technique to be used. Table 3.4.2 shows the parameters 
to be chosen for each of the four main techniques used to remove potential disclosure.
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Technique Parameters Frequent Choices
Rounding Style of rounding 
b -  rounding base
Controlled Rounding 
b -5 ,1 0
Adding Noise Type of noise
e - non biased random variable
Additive Noise 
e - Norm(0,a)
Cell Suppression Secondary suppression technique Hypercube, Modular, 
Network, Optimal
Table Redesign Variables to be grouped Any sensible Grouping
Table 3.4.2. Parameter selections required for various techniques to remove 
potential disclosure. Techniques in italic are available in Tau-Argus.
The parameters chosen for each test are often dependent on the data. For example if 
the table contained cells with generally large values the rounding base or the variance 
of the noise may be large as the protection would be increased without a significant 
effect on the utility of the data. As mentioned in section 2.2.2 the choice of secondary 
suppression for the cell suppression technique is explicitly dependent on the data and 
in particular the make up of the variables, therefore this choice is not a selection to be 
made by the statistician but is decided by nature of the data. In the case of table 
redesign it is important (as mentioned in section 3.1) that the statistician consults with 
the end user to identify potential groupings that are both sensible and retain the utility 
of the data.
3.5 Practical Applications of Statistical Disclosure Control Methods
It has become clear throughout chapter 3 that there are many choices facing the 
statistician in the statistical disclosure control process. The theoretical effect of these 
choices has already been discussed and when a disclosure control procedure is being
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discussed it is prudent for the statistician to consider the theoretical effect each 
procedure will have on the table. However it is of interest to investigate further the 
statistical effect these choices would have in a real scenario. It has already been noted 
that there may be many influences on the choice of disclosure control procedure 
however it is useful for the statistician to consider how effective each disclosure 
control procedure would be if these outside influences were disregarded. This could 
be achieved by carrying out a variety of statistical disclosure control procedures on a 
real set of data and comparing the information loss between the actual table and the 
disclosure controlled table. This will lead to a multitude of comparisons between the 
information loss produced by different techniques for both detecting potential 
disclosure in the data and removing potential disclosure from the data. The 
information taken from these comparisons may be useful to the statistician in 
selecting potential disclosure control process that they will follow in a variety of 
scenarios. Chapter 4 will concentrate on evaluating the performance of a variety of 
selected disclosure control methods on actual data.
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4. Statistical Disclosure Control in Practice: An Application 
to ISD Data
4.1 Data Problem
In order to compare different methods used to control disclosure, data is required from 
which potentially disclosive tables may be produced. This comparison of methods 
will be carried out in this thesis, however steps will be taken to ensure that no 
potential disclosure results from the publication of the work. The data used to 
evaluate the performance of various disclosure control methods in this thesis are real 
data provided by ISD and report the results of a study carried out in diabetes in 
children in Scotland. Information was collected on children who had been diagnosed 
with diabetes and also on a control set. There were data from 365 children with 
diabetes and 499428 control children. A selection of variables was chosen that might 
have had a causal affect on the chance of a child developing diabetes. All the 
variables are categorical (meaning the resulting tables will be frequency tables) and a 
list of the variables and the number of categories it contains is given in table 4.1.1.
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Variable Description
Sex 2 categories
Age 10 categories
Geographical Indicator Hierarchical variable, 26 categories (including 1 
category for missing values)
Deprivation Decile 12 categories (including 1 category for missing values)
Year of Treatment 3 categories
Diabetes/No Diabetes 2 categories
Table 4.1.1: Description o f variables in ISD data set.
The geographical indicator is a mixture of health board and the first 2 letters of the 
postcode. For example if the subject was from Greater Glasgow Health Board and 
their postcode was G12 8HX the geographical indicator would simply be GG1.
There are many characteristics of the data that give a high chance of potential 
disclosure. One of those characteristics is that there are so few children with diabetes 
compared to those control children which may result in cells with few subjects. Also 
the fact that some of the variables (in particular variables 2,3 and 4) have so many 
categories may result in cells which have relatively few subjects. There is also a 
chance that when the missing values are included in the table that if the data are good 
(i.e. there are few missing values) the cells of the table pertaining to missing values 
will contain few subjects.
There is also an issue with regards potential disclosure of these data in the sense that 
diabetes in children may be regarded as sensitive data since illness in children and
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causes of such are always issues which the media have a great deal of interest in. In 
fact the idea of an outsider being able to uncover the identity of a child with diabetes 
makes ISD uncomfortable in general. Unfortunately there are issues such as 
prejudices due to misinformation that follow people who are diabetic and it may be 
the case that the family of a certain child do not want their condition to be widely 
known. It is the responsibility of ISD to ensure that a disclosure situation of this type 
does not occur. This places added importance on the disclosure control method 
implemented by the organisation since there may be outside bodies wishing to 
uncover disclosure to benefit their own needs. On the other hand it is extremely 
important that researchers have good data from which to investigate potential factors 
which may potentially cause diabetes in children. Good research in this area may 
allow changes in policy to help reduce instances of the disease in children which is 
clearly beneficial to society. At the request of ISD, due to the fact that the data set 
contains sensitive data and potential disclosure may occur from tables of the data, no 
tables of the data will appear in this thesis.
4.2 Current ISD Policy
ISD currently have draft guidelines in place regarding potential disclosure from small 
numbers. The guidelines are regarded as advice which should be used along with the 
National Statistics Protocol on Disclosure. The advice pertains only to the potential 
disclosure caused by having cell values which are close to unity and only considers 
frequency data. Clearly this over simplifies the disclosure risk to the table since no 
consideration is made of the fact that there are many more complex settings in which
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potential disclosure occurs. The guidelines provide a method of deciding on a 
treatment for each cell using four criteria:
• The size of geographical areas to be presented.
• The population size i.e. the marginal value.
• The numerator size i.e. the cell value.
• Whether or not the data in question is ‘sensitive’.
The guidelines provide a description as to what should be deemed sensitive by ISD 
analysts. In fact a list is given which includes the major areas which should be 
deemed sensitive, although other topics can be included if required.
Sensitive Health-Related Data include:
• Sexually Transmitted diseases
• Abortions
• Pregnancies in girls aged under 16
• Suicides
• Self-harm
• Mental health diagnoses
• Mental health conditions
• Alcohol and Drugs misuse
• Prescriptions for contraceptives
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The list is considered a framework but often requests come for lower level data and 
the analyst must consider whether the condition falls under one of these categories. 
This is not always as simple as it may seem e.g. for Kaposi’s Sarcoma data requests 
the analyst checking would find that this condition is related to AIDS, thus linked to 
both a sexually transmitted disease and possibly falling within the umbrella of drugs 
misuse. Such an analysis should therefore be treated as sensitive. Also if an analyst 
is asked to prepare data on individuals with Korsakoff’s Syndrome, a condition that is 
related to alcoholism, the analyst would be expected to treat it as sensitive data. It is 
important that the analyst investigates the data they are asked to reveal and ensures 
that they know whether the data fall into the sensitive category. This may require 
them to either refer to a medical dictionary or confer with a Consultant or some expert 
with specialist knowledge. Furthermore if there is a situation where the content of the 
data may allow the identity of a subject to be uncovered the data can be deemed as 
sensitive and not released. This decision is taken in consultation with the Caldicott 
guardian and/or the Head of Statistics.
ISD guidelines suggest using a technique called the bamardising method to protect 
unsafe cells. This is a perturbative method which adjusts the value of cells which 
contain small numbers to mask the true cell values. The method is only used on cells 
which contain less than 5 subjects. The adjustments of the original value are given in 
table 4.2.1.
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True Value Possible Presented Values
0 0
l 1,2
2 1,2,3
3 2, 3,4
4 3,4
Table 4.2.1: Possible adjustments of the true cell value due to barnardisation
Possible values do not occur with equal probability. The choice of possible value is 
weighted with the true value having a larger possibility of selection than one of the 
false values. The ratio for weight is 1:4, e.g.
True Value = 1 Possible presented value = 1 (with probability 0.8) or
2 (with probability 0.2)
True Value = 2 Possible presented value = 1 (with probability 0.1) or
2 (with probability 0.8) or
3 (with probability 0.1)
The marginals in the table are also adjusted so as to protect the additivity of the table.
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4.3 Application to ISD Scenario
As mentioned in section 4.1 the data used in this thesis come from working data used 
by ISD. This data set was thought to have potential disclosure issues due to the fact 
that there were few diabetes cases in rural areas such as the Highlands. However the 
study was an extensive piece of work carried out over a number of health boards 
which contained some interesting results therefore it was important that ISD used 
statistical disclosure control to allow data to be published. This led ISD to consider 
the number of options available to them to protect the table they had produced from 
this potential disclosure whilst retaining the utility of the data for further analysis. At 
the moment ISD have a policy on disclosure control which makes use of a technique 
called bamardisation (see section 4.2 for details). This technique could be applied to 
these data however it is of interest to discover whether other techniques may provide a 
more effective solution to the problem. This allows for a comparison between the 
effectiveness of the bamardisation technique and the various techniques discussed in 
this thesis.
The policy ISD implement takes account of whether or not the information gathered is 
regarded as ‘sensitive’. There is a list of the areas regarded as ‘sensitive’ in section
4.2 and it is of interest to note that diabetes is not regarded as a sensitive area. It may 
be argued that any data relating to the health of children are sensitive especially due to 
potential interest from the media that would be generated by any startling results in 
the field of child health care. However no account is taken of the age of the patients 
in the ISD policy and it is assumed that the presence or otherwise of diabetes does not 
cause sufficient distress if discovered to the subject to be regarded as ‘sensitive’.
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There is though a sufficient risk to the confidentiality of the individual children in the 
stud/ for disclosure control techniques to be implemented.
The aim of the study, as with most studies undertaken by ISD, is to provide results 
which may be presented to the public and can be used for both further analysis and for 
general information whilst not causing any risk to the confidentiality of the 
individuals. This provides ISD with its own problem in terms of how the data should 
be presented. This is due to the fact that it may be the case that one statistical 
disclosure technique is more informative for producing tables which are useful for 
further analysis whereas one technique may be preferential when it comes to 
disseminating general information. ISD cannot produce the same table which has 
been subject to two different disclosure control rules since this will significantly 
increase the possibility of disclosure and should be avoided. This scenario is made 
simpler when the table produced is part of a data request and the disclosure technique 
can be discussed with the end user before handover however in many cases the above 
scenario occurs and ISD must think about how best to balance the needs of academics 
with those of the general public.
4.4 Comparing Different Disclosure Methods on Frequency Data 
Using Tau-Argus
ISD do not currently use Tau-Argus to provide disclosure control for the data they 
produce. There is an interest from the management in potentially implementing Tau- 
Arg^is to protect their data. There is the suggestion that Tau-Argus can be used to 
provide a large number of disclosure control methods which provide adequate
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protection to the data and the program is fast and simple to use. This chapter will 
investigate various methods provided by Tau-Argus on ISD data and evaluate their 
performance on ISD data with particular comparison to current ISD practice.
The flow chart in section 3.2 and the parameter selection protocol outlined in section
3.4 show the choices that must be made when selecting the disclosure method. This 
chapter will investigate the effects of the different choices using Tau-Argus when 
applied to the ISD data set with the aim of discovering how different choices affect 
the utility of the final table. As mentioned all the variables in the data are categorical 
which means that all the tables produced will be frequency tables and therefore the 
only method for detecting potential disclosure available through Tau-Argus is the 
minimum frequency rule. Once the unsafe cells have been identified Tau-Argus 
offers one perturbative and two non perturbative techniques for removing the 
potential disclosure from the data. The perturbative technique offered is rounding and 
the specific form of rounding offered by Tau-Argus is controlled rounding. The two 
non perturbative techniques offered are cell suppression and table redesign. When 
cell suppression is chosen the user can select from optimal, modular or hypercube 
suppression techniques and must also choose between weighting the cells due to the 
frequency of each cell or weighting each cell equally (unity). When table redesign is 
chosen the user must select the levels of each variable that can be grouped together. 
Also once table redesign has been carried out either rounding or cell suppression can 
be implemented on the new table.
There were many tables produced from the data which resulted in no potential 
disclosure risk according to the safety rule. These tables will not be considered and
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onlytables where there was a potential risk present will be discussed. One of the 
advaitages of Tau-Argus is that it can protect tables of many levels with relative ease 
howtver in this thesis only tables of 2 and 3 dimensions will be considered. This 
resuled in three 2-dimension tables and six 3-dimension tables being considered. The 
list of tables protected using the variety of rules was:
Geo£ Indicator x Deprivation Decile 
Age i Deprivation Decile 
Age i Geog Indicator
Sex x Geog Indicator x Deprivation Decile 
Sex x Age x Deprivation Decile 
Sex x Age x Geog Indicator
Diabetes/No Diabetes x Geog Indicator x Deprivation Decile 
Diabetes/No Diabetes x Age x Deprivation Decile 
Diabetes/No Diabetes x Geog Indicator
Furthermore it was decided that it was possible to collapse Geographic Indicator, Age 
and Deprivation Decile into subgroups to allow for table redesign to be carried out. 
Therefore every table has been subject to some form of table redesign to attempt to 
remove the disclosure or at least to aid the further disclosure methods. Table redesign 
has successfully made the following tables safe from potential disclosure:
Age x Geog Indicator (Redesigned)
Age (Redesigned) x Geog Indicator (Redesigned)
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Sex x Age x Geog Indicator (Redesigned)
Sex x Age (Redesigned) x Geog Indicator (Redesigned)
Outcome x Age (Redesigned) x Geog Indicator (Redesigned) (Minimum Frequency 5 
and 10 only)
A technique using information loss in the table to evaluate the performance of the 
disclosure control method selected has been described in Quantifying Information 
Loss (section 2.3). This technique is simple and gives a quick comparison of the 
disclosure control method without the need for further analysis. It is of primary use 
when comparing different forms of the same method of disclosure control. For 
example the information loss technique is a reasonable way to compare the effect of 
using the optimal cell suppression technique as opposed to using the hypercube cell 
suppression technique or to compare the effect of using 5 as the rounding base as 
opposed to using 3 as the rounding base. However it may be argued that the 
performance of the disclosure control technique can only properly be investigated by 
quantifying the effect that the disclosure control has on further analysis carried out on 
the table i.e. how does the further analysis differ when using the disclosure controlled 
table as opposed to the raw table. Therefore it is sensible to carry out some further 
analysis on the tables to compare the performance of the different techniques. This 
also allows comparisons to be made between the different disclosure control 
techniques. This would have been problematic if the information loss technique had 
been used since the method for quantifying information loss was different for the 
different techniques meaning that it may have been possible to attribute any difference 
in information loss to the differing quantification techniques as opposed to a 
difference in the effectiveness of the techniques.
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The further analysis used to compare the different disclosure control methods can take 
many forms, in fact any reasonable form of further analysis is acceptable. The further 
analysis that will be used in this thesis involves constructing a log linear model from 
each table. The model was constructed from the actual table and then for all the 
tables produced by the various disclosure control methods. It was decided that a 
reasonable barometer of how the disclosure control method has performed is how 
close the residual deviance from the log linear model produced using the disclosure 
controlled table is to the residual deviance from the log linear model produced using 
the actual table. To produce a value for this the absolute value of the difference 
between the residual deviances of the models from the two tables was calculated and 
this was divided by the residual deviance from the model from the actual table and 
multiplied by one hundred thus giving a percentage difference between the residual 
deviance from a model from the actual table and the residual deviance from a model 
from the disclosure controlled table. It is assumed that all disclosure control methods 
have made the respective tables safe from potential disclosure and that the concern is 
how different the further analysis is using the disclosure controlled table instead of the 
actual table rather than if there is any risk of disclosure.
The results, and the analysis of these results, produced by different choices in the 
statistical disclosure control process will be investigated and reported under six 
subsections:
4.4.1 Choice of Minimum Safe Frequency
4.4.2 Choice of Rounding Base
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4.4.: Choice of Secondary Suppression Technique in All Tables
4.4/ Choice of Secondary Suppression Technique in Tables Containing a 
Hienrchical Variable
4.4.1 Choice between Rounding and Cell Suppression
4.4.(Choice between Rounding and Bamardisation
In al tables the information loss quoted in the cells is calculated as the average, over 
eachtable of the specified design, of the percentage difference between the residual 
deviaice from the log linear model from the disclosure controlled table and the 
residial deviance from the log linear model from the actual table.
4.4.1 Choice of Minimum Safe Frequency
As mentioned above it is clear that the choice of minimum safe frequency will have 
an effect on the final disclosure controlled table. It would seem reasonable to assume 
that ai the minimum safe frequency increases the percentage difference in residual 
deviaices from the log linear models will increase. The effect of the choice of 
mininum safe frequency is only really prominent when cell suppression is chosen as 
the mithod of disclosure control. This is the case since when rounding is chosen the 
minimum frequency mle merely flags a table as unsafe if one of the cells is deemed 
unsaft and then plays no further role in the disclosure control process whereas when 
cell sippression is chosen the minimum frequency rule determines how many cells 
will be primary suppressed clearly effecting the make up of the disclosure controlled 
table. Therefore the effect of the minimum safe frequency can only be properly 
investigated by comparing the cell suppression methods for different minimum safe
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frequencies. The minimum safe frequencies that were applied to the tables from these 
data were 3 (the default in Tau-Argus), 5 (a very common choice) and 10 (a very 
cautious choice). Table 4.3.1 and Table 4.3.2 show the average, over each table of the 
specified design, of the percentage difference between the residual deviance from the 
log linear model from the disclosure controlled table and the residual deviance from 
the log linear model from the actual table for two different cell suppression methods 
for the three different minimum frequencies.
Design
M i n \  
Freq \
2-dim 2-dim(l var 
redesign)
2-dim(2 var 
redesign)
3-dim 3-dim(l var 
redesign)
3-dim(2 var 
redesign)
All
3 11.62 13.53 11.26 12.44 11.29 12.85 12.11
5 14.35 17.56 11.77 13.45 14.38 13.93 14.49
10 16.02 20.83 22.80 17.09 19.32 15.97 18.52
Table 4.4.1: Percentage difference in residuals deviances between actual and disclosure 
controlled tables for separate minimum frequencies and table designs. Optimal secondary 
suppression used.
sv  Design
M i n \  
Freq \
2-dim 2-dim(l var 
redesign)
2-dim(2 var 
redesign)
3-dim 3-dim(l var 
redesign)
3-dim(2 var 
redesign)
All
3 10.85 14.39 23.45 19.52 16.69 16.80 16.75
5 14.20 18.75 23.45 21.80 23.35 17.36 20.66
10 17.64 20.21 22.80 27.03 24.71 16.70 22.41
Table 4.4.2: Percentage difference in residuals deviances between actual and disclosure 
controlled tables for separate minimum frequencies and table designs. Hypercube 
secondary suppression used.
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Table 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 appear to confirm the assumption that as the minimum safe 
frequency increases the utility of the table in the further analysis decreases using this 
data. This is the case for all the table designs for both secondary suppression 
techniques except for the case when hypercube secondary suppression is used on the 
3-dimension tables with 2 variables redesigned where when 10 is used as the 
minimum safe frequency the average percentage difference between the two residual 
deviances is lower than when 3 or 5 is the minimum safe frequency. The results are 
however very close to what is expected and illustrates nicely the trade off to be made 
between data utility and potential disclosure.
4.4.2 Choice of Rounding Base
It is also intuitively obvious that if rounding is chosen as the disclosure control 
method that adjusting the rounding base will result in a change in the final disclosure 
controlled table. It would seem clear that the pattern should follow that of changing 
the minimum safe frequency and that as the rounding base increases the difference in 
residual deviance between the model from the disclosure controlled table and the 
model from the actual table will get larger. This makes intuitive sense since the larger 
the base the further away the rounded value is likely to be from the value in the actual 
table. The rounding bases applied to the tables from this data set were 3,5 and 10. 
These choices give a reasonable spread of potential options since 3 is as small a 
rounding base as would ever be reasonable and 10 is a large rounding base, especially 
for this data. Table 4.3.3 shows the average, over each table of the specified design, of 
the percentage difference between the residual deviance from the log linear model 
from the disclosure controlled table and the residual deviance from the log linear
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model from the actual table for tables produced using all three rounding bases (the 
rows).
''v Design 
Base \
2-dim 2-dim(l var 
redesign)
2-dim(2 var 
redesign)
3-dim 3-dim(l var 
redesign)
3-dim(2 var 
redesign)
AH
3 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.019 0.005 0.006 0.007
5 0.027 0.013 0.016 0.029 0.010 0.003 0.015
10 0.057 0.057 0.252 0.057 0.038 0.096 0.069
Table 4.4.3: Percentage difference in residuals deviances between actual and disclosure 
controlled tables for separate rounding bases and table designs.
Table 4.3.3 shows that, as expected, as the rounding base increases the effectiveness 
of the table in further analysis appears to decrease when using this data. Once again 
this is the case for all designs of tables except for where rounding base 5 gives a 
slightly more accurate residual deviance than rounding base 3 in the 3-dimension 
tables with two variables redesigned on this data set but the difference is extremely 
small (0.003%). Once again these results illustrate the trade off between data utility 
and potential disclosure however it is also interesting to note that that the percentages 
are extremely small with the highest average percentage difference being 0.252% and 
even this is for a 2-dimension table with two variables redesigned and a rounding base 
of 10 which is a scenario which is unlikely to occur in practice.
4.43  Choice of Secondary Suppression Technique in All Tables
When cell suppression is chosen as the disclosure control method there is a less 
intuitive decision for the statistician to make with regards the secondary suppression
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method. This is due to the fact that there is a selection of secondary suppression 
methods which can be used in a variety of scenarios. Four different secondary 
suppression methods are described in Section 2.2.2 however only two of the methods 
(hypercube and optimal) are applicable to all of the tables produced from this data set 
whilst one of the methods (modular) is only applicable to the tables containing 
Variable 3 since it requires the table to contain a hierarchical variable. The optimal 
secondary suppression technique should, as the name would suggest, give the most 
effective solution to the suppression problem. However it is computationally complex 
and for large tables an attempt to find an optimal solution may be time consuming and 
at times near impossible. In these situations a time limit is set and Tau-Argus will 
compute a near optimal solution in the specified time frame. Fortunately for this data 
there was only one occasion (Sex x Deprivation Decile x Geog Indicator) where the 
optimal solution was not found in 3 minutes and a near optimal solution was used. It 
would also be hoped that the modular secondary suppression method would be 
effective on the tables which contain a hierarchical variable since it has been designed 
specifically for this scenario. The hypercube secondary suppression method requires 
relatively little computing power compared to the optimal and modular methods 
making it quick to run whilst still being reasonably effective. There are two 
potentially interesting comparisons that are of primary interest here. Firstly the 
comparison between the optimal and hypercube secondary suppression methods to 
investigate whether the increased computing power required for the optimal method 
results in a significant improvement in the effectiveness of the final table in further 
analysis. Secondly the comparison between the modular method and the hypercube 
and optimal methods on the tables containing a hierarchical variable to investigate
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wheher the case specific method is more effective than the standard methods in 
producing tables which are more useful in further analysis.
Tabk 4.3.4 shows the average, over each table of the specified design, of the 
percentage difference between the residual deviance from the log linear model from 
the disclosure controlled table and the residual deviance from the log linear model 
from the actual table for tables produced using both the optimal and hypercube 
secondary suppression methods for the three chosen minimum frequencies.
\  Design
Supp \  
Method \
Min
Freq
2-dim 2-dim(l
var
redesign)
2-dim(2
var
redesign)
3-dim 3-dim(l
var
redesign)
3-dim(2
var
redesign)
Total
O 3 11.62 13.53 11.26 12.44 11.29 12.85 12.11
H 3 10.85 14.39 23.45 19.52 16.69 16.80 16.75
O 5 14.35 17.56 11.77 13.45 14.38 13.93 14.49
H 5 14.20 18.75 23.45 21.80 23.35 17.36 20.66
O 10 16.02 20.83 22.80 17.09 19.32 15.97 18.52
H 10 17.64 20.21 22.80 27.03 24.71 16.70 22.41
Table 4.4.4: Percentage difference in residuals deviances between actual and 
disclosure controlled tables for separate secondary suppression methodsminimum 
frequencies and table designs. O-Optimal Method H-Hypercube Method.
It would appear that, given the values in table 4.3.4, as expected the optimal 
secondary suppression method does in general produce a more effective table with 
which to carry out further analysis than the hypercube secondary suppression method 
for this data set. This can be seen by the fact that almost every set of tables produced
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by the optimal method give a lower percentage difference between the residual 
deviance from the actual table and the disclosure controlled table than when the 
hypercube method is used. It is interesting to note that in the 3-dimension tables there 
seems to be a larger difference between the optimal and hypercube methods and in 
fact in three cases in the 2-dimension tables (2-dimension no redesign min freq 3, 2- 
dimension no redesign min freq 5, 2-dimension one variable redesign min freq 10) the 
hypercube method does on average produce tables from which the residual deviance 
of the log linear model are closer to that given by the actual table than the optimal 
method whereas in the 3-dimension tables there are no cases where the hypercube 
method performs more effectively than the optimal method. It would appear, from 
the results from these data, that when time constraints and computing power allow the 
optimal method should be preferred over the hypercube method as the secondary 
suppression method of choice in all cases. The difference appears to have a more 
significant effect in the more complex higher level tables.
4.4.4 Choice of Secondary Suppression Technique in Tables Containing a 
Hierarchical Variable
Table 4.3.5 again shows the average, over each table of the specified design, of the 
percentage difference between the residual deviance from the log linear model from 
the disclosure controlled table and the residual deviance from the log linear model 
from the actual table for tables containing variable 3 (the hierarchical variable) 
produced using the three secondary suppression methods and using the three different 
minimum frequencies.
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\  Design
Supp \  
Method \
Min
Freq
2-dim 2-dim(l
var
redesign)
2-dim(2
var
redesign)
3-dim 3-dim(l
var
redesign)
3-dim(2
var
redesign)
Total
O 3 14.15 16.13 4.51 13.27 12.76 12.00 13.03
H 3 12.86 17.45 28.88 23.44 21.58 18.87 20.50
M 3 13.68 16.84 4.51 15.52 13.15 12.00 13.71
O 5 15.83 18.56 4.51 14.52 16.16 12.00 15.12
H 5 14.50 23.12 28.88 26.22 29.60 18.87 25.11
M 5 15.23 18.43 4.51 17.80 16.33 12.00 15.78
O 10 18.16 23.67 26.56 19.17 21.80 16.03 20.56
H 10 19.48 23.86 26.56 32.59 30.76 15.91 26.53
M 10 17.98 23.13 26.56 20.40 21.67 16.03 20.67
Table 4.4.5: Percentage difference in residuals deviances between actual and disclosure 
controlled tables for separate secondary suppression methods, minimum frequencies and 
table designs. O-Optimal method H-Hypercube method M-Modular method.
One of the interesting comparisons in table 4.3.5 is between the percentage difference 
of the residual deviances from the log linear model from the actual table and from the 
disclosure controlled table using the modular method and the optimal method at the 
various levels. This comparison is of interest since, as noted above, the optimal 
method appears to be more effective than the hypercube method in retaining the 
effectiveness of the table for further analysis in all cases whilst the modular method is 
used specifically for dealing with hierarchical variables. However a potential problem 
of analysing this table in too much detail is that some of the cells contain very few 
observations. This is due to the fact that there is only one hierarchical variable in the
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data se: and there is a limit to the number of tables that contain potential disclosure 
that can be created. This may result in some slightly skewed data, however it is hoped 
that any trends established would be replicated by the use of more tables.
The first observation to make about table 4.3.5 is that in most cases the optimal 
method and the modular method produce tables which are far more effective in the 
further analysis than the hypercube method on these data. The only exception to this 
is in the 2-dimension tables with no variable redesign where the hypercube method 
produces tables more effective for the further analysis when the minimum safe 
frequency is three and five and the effectiveness of the tables produced by the three 
methods is similar when the minimum safe frequency is ten. This observation is not 
unexpected and leads to the more interesting comparison between the optimal 
secondary suppression method and the modular secondary suppression method.
There appears to be very little to choose between the two methods with regards to the 
percentage difference between the residual deviances of the actual model and the 
disclosure controlled model. The total average does suggest that over all types of 
model the optimal method may provide on average slightly better tables from which 
to carry out further analysis however in many of the cells the values are the same 
suggesting the same tables were produced by both methods. It may be suggested that 
using modular secondary suppression may be a worthwhile alternative to using the 
optimal method since it is less time consuming and requires less computing power. 
However to draw any real conclusions on this more tables would certainly have to be 
investigated.
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4.4.5 Choice between Rounding and Cell Suppression
The decision made by the statistician that has the most affect on the make up of the 
table is the choice of disclosure control methods. This decision will affect both the 
aesthetic qualities of the table and the ability for a user to carry out further analysis 
using the table. Tau-Argus offers three techniques for removing potential disclosure 
in the tables. These are rounding, cell suppression and table redesign. As has been 
seen earlier, table redesign can be combined with either of the other two techniques. 
The decision about whether table redesign is a valid disclosure control technique to 
use in each individual situation is more often governed by issues other than the 
statistical implications of a redesigned table. These issues include whether there are 
groupings which the separate categories of the variables can be collapsed into and 
whether the end user has use for tables which have been redesigned or if they require 
the table with the original categories. It is generally believed however that if table 
redesign is reasonable and doing so protects the table and retains the utility for the 
user this technique should be applied. These issues can also have a bearing on 
whether the rounding or cell suppression method is used since the end user may prefer 
a table which has been rounded rather than one which has had cells suppressed and 
vice versa. However it is useful to be able to investigate the statistical implications of 
each method and how they affect the effectiveness of the tables in terms of further 
analysis. The table (Table 4.3.5) shows the average, over each table of the specified 
design, of the percentage difference between the residual deviance from the log linear 
model from the disclosure controlled table and the residual deviance from the log 
linear model for tables which have been both optimal suppressed and controlled 
rounded. Optimal suppression was chosen as the secondary suppression technique for
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the ell suppression method since it has been shown earlier that in almost all cases it 
is at east equally as an effective method for allowing accurate further analysis as 
either of the other secondary suppression techniques.
\  Design 
Method
Min Freq 
/Base
2-
dim
2-dim(l
var
redesign)
2-dim(2
var
redesign)
3-dim 3-dim(l
var
redesign)
3-dim(2
var
redesign)
Total
O 3 11.62 13.53 11.26 12.44 11.29 12.85 12.11
R 3 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.019 0.005 0.006 0.007
O 5 14.35 17.56 11.77 13.45 14.38 13.93 14.49
R 5 0.027 0.013 0.016 0.029 0.010 0.003 0.015
O 10 16.02 20.83 22.80 17.09 19.32 15.97 18.52
R 10 0.057 0.057 0.252 0.057 0.038 0.096 0.069
Table 4.4.6: Percentage difference in residuals deviances between actual and disclosure 
controlled tables for separate suppression methods and table designs. O-Optimal secondary 
suppression method R-Controlled rounding.
The main observation that can be made from table 4.3.6 is that for all the specific 
table designs and minimum frequencies/rounding bases in this data set the 
effectiveness of the rounded tables in further analysis is much greater than for tables 
with cells suppressed. The difference between the two methods is so large that it is 
fair to say that controlled rounding is a more effective technique than cell suppression 
for controlling disclosure in tables in terms of retaining the usefulness of the table for 
further analysis. However, as mentioned earlier, this does not necessarily mean that 
controlled rounding should always be used on this type of data. There may be 
occasions where the user can get the information they need from a table containing
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suppressed cells which would not have been possible had all the cells in the table been 
rounded. It does appear from table 4.3.6 that if further analysis is to be carried out on 
the table then using controlled rounding provides an effective technique for retaining 
the usefulness of the data.
4.4.6 Choice between Rounding and Bamardisation
It was mentioned in section 4.2 that ISD currently use a technique known as 
bamardisation to protect tables from potential disclosure. This technique is not 
available on Tau-Argus however the tables used in these comparisons were protected 
using a bamardisation program written on another package to allow a comparison 
between the current method of ISD with potential new methods such as rounding and 
cell suppression. Due to the nature of the bamardisation technique (i.e. it is a 
perturbative method) it seems reasonable to compare the results from the tables 
produced using bamardisation to those from the tables produced using rounding.
Table 4.3.5 shows the average, over each table of the specified design, of the 
percentage difference between the residual deviance from the log linear model from 
the disclosure controlled table and the residual deviance from the log linear model 
from the tables which have been rounded using the three different bases and the tables 
produced by bamardisation.
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\  Design 
Base \
2-dim 2-dim(l var 
redesign)
2-dim(2 var 
redesign)
3-dim 3-dim(l var 
redesign)
3-dim(2 var 
redesign)
All
3 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.019 0.005 0.006 0.007
5 0.027 0.013 0.016 0.029 0.010 0.003 0.015
10 0.057 0.057 0.252 0.057 0.038 0.096 0.069
B 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.006
Table 4.4.7: Percentage difference in residuals deviances between actual and 
disclosure controlled tables for separate rounding bases, the bamardisation technique 
and table designs. B-Bamardisation.
Table 4.3.7 appears to show that on these data, bamardisation provides tables which 
are more effective in terms of handling further analysis than rounding with a base 5 or 
10. There appears to be little difference between the effectiveness of bamardisation 
and rounding to base 3. It appears from these results that bamardisation is a good 
choice when it comes to removing potential disclosure from a table and in fact in the 
correct circumstance may provide a useful tool in terms of disclosure control. 
However it may be that since bamardisation adjusts the marginal values of the tables 
only slightly that it may be subject to a threat from record linkage where an intruder 
can use a combination of a number of different tables from the same area and 
combine the data to pose an identification threat.
4.5 Observations on Comparisons of Different Methods
It is clear, from chapter 2, that there are many different methods which can be used to 
detect potential disclosure and protect against it. The number of potential methods 
compared in this chapter was restricted due to two factors, namely the data provided
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and the limitations of the Tau-Argus package. The data provided by ISD could only 
be used to produce frequency tables. This is the case with the majority of the work 
carried out by ISD so the need to investigate the effect of the various methods on this 
style of table was much greater than an investigation into the efficiency of the 
methods on magnitude tables. There are numerous methods to detect potential 
disclosure in magnitude tables whereas there are a rather limited number of methods 
to detect disclosure in frequency tables. Therefore the lack of magnitude data results 
in a lack of investigation into differing methods for detecting potential disclosure. 
Furthermore Tau-Argus clearly has a limit to the number of methods it can carry out. 
In fact for detecting potential disclosure in frequency tables the only test on offer is 
the minimum frequency test. Also when protecting the table against the potential 
disclosure Tau-Argus does not offer any option to add random noise to the data but 
concentrates on controlled rounding and cell suppression whilst also allowing table 
redesign to occur. In spite of these restrictions there are plenty of methods available 
for comparison given the data available and the comparison of these produced some 
interesting results.
A problem encountered was how best to compare the effectiveness of the different 
disclosure control methods. Tau-Argus offers a value for information loss in the table 
summary option. This calculates the information lost as a result of the disclosure 
control process following the rules given in section 2.3. This representation of the 
information lost due to the disclosure control process could legitimately be used to 
compare the effectiveness of different variants on the same method for example when 
comparing between two separate secondary suppression methods or when comparing 
two separate rounding bases. However since the information loss for the different
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methods is calculated using different techniques these values of information loss 
cannot be used to compare the different methods therefore another measure of 
effectiveness of the techniques was required. It was decided to use a measure of how 
the disclosure controlled table would perform in further analysis compared to the 
actual table. This was done by calculating the difference between the residual 
deviances of the models from the two tables and dividing by the residual deviance 
from the model from the actual table and multiplying by one hundred thus giving a 
percentage difference between the residual deviance from a model from the actual 
table and the residual deviance from a model from the disclosure controlled table. 
This was calculated for a variety of methods to produce results relating to the average 
effectiveness of the various methods.
Some initial observations from the various disclosure control processes were the 
speed with which Tau-Argus computed the disclosure controlled tables and the effect 
of table redesign on some of the tables. Tau-Argus produces the tables from the raw 
data and then implements the various disclosure control processes almost 
instantaneously. This is extremely useful if the user wishes to try a selection of 
disclosure control methods on the table. Also if the user is wishing to redesign the 
table this process is also made simple by Tau-Argus. Table redesign was 
implemented on the tables used in this study. It is often the case that if table redesign 
is applicable to the table and is acceptable to the end user and in doing so the 
statistician can make the table safe from potential disclosure this method will be 
implemented since no information is adjusted or suppressed. Four tables from these 
data were made safe from potential disclosure by using table redesign and a further 
table was made safe from potential disclosure for minimum frequency 5 and 10.
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However if ihe redesigned table requires further disclosure control methods to make it 
safe it is often the case that the redesigning of the table provides no real advantage to 
the disclosure control process.
In section 4.4 different options available to the statistician in the disclosure control 
process were considered and a comparison made of the options. The options 
compared were:
1. Choice of minimum safe frequency
2. Choice of rounding base
3. Choice of cell suppression method (across all table)
4. Choice of cell suppression method (across table containing a hierarchical 
variable)
5. Choice of controlled rounding or cell suppression
6. Choice of bamardisation or controlled rounding
Three separate minimum safe frequencies were compared in the study. These were 
three, five and ten. It was found that, as expected, in general as the minimum safe 
frequency increased the percentage difference between the residual deviance from a 
model from the actual table and the residual deviance from a model from the 
disclosure controlled table increased implying that the table was less useful in further 
analysis when the minimum safe frequency was larger. This is unsurprising since as 
the minimum safe frequency increased either the number of cells which had to be 
suppressed or the rounding base, depending on the disclosure control method, would 
increase so the disclosure controlled table would be further from the actual table.
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When using rounding as the disclosure control method and the minimum frequency 
rule to detect potential disclosure the whole table must be rounded if any of the cells 
is deemed unsafe by the disclosure detection rule. This can sometimes result in large 
tables with only one safe cell being rounded. Three separate rounding bases for the 
controlled rounding method were compared in the study. These were three, five and 
ten. It was also found that, again as expected, in general as the rounding base 
increased the percentage difference between the residual deviance from a model from 
the actual table and the residual deviance from a model from the disclosure controlled 
table increased implying that the table was less useful in further analysis when the 
rounding base was larger. Again this is unsurprising since a larger rounding base will 
result in many of the cell values being further away from their value in the actual table 
than if a smaller rounding base was used. This is not the case for every cell but over a 
whole table the difference will usually become significant.
There are four methods for secondary suppression available in Tau-Argus. Of these 
only optimal suppression and hypercube suppression were applicable to all tables in 
this study whilst modular suppression was only applicable to the tables containing 
geographical indicator (the only hierarchical variable). It made sense to firstly 
compare the optimal and hypercube methods across all the tables. Doing this showed 
that the optimal secondary suppression method appeared to in general give a lower 
percentage difference between the residual deviance from a model from the actual 
table and the residual deviance from a model from the disclosure controlled table than 
the hypercube secondary suppression method over all the tables. This difference 
appeared to be larger for 3-dimension tables than 2-dimension tables. This result is
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not surprising although it should be remembered that the optimal method requires 
more computing power and in some occasions more time to run than the hypercube 
method. If the statistician has access to sufficient computing power they should 
endeavour to use the optimal method over the hypercube method.
The modular secondary suppression method is a technique for dealing specifically 
with tables which contain a hierarchical variable. Optimal and hypercube secondary 
suppression methods can also deal with hierarchical variables in the table so it was of 
interest to compare these techniques with the modular method. The comparison of 
these methods over the tables with a hierarchical variable showed that both the 
modular and optimal secondary suppression methods in general gave a lower 
percentage difference between the residual deviance from a model from the actual 
table and the residual deviance from a model from the disclosure controlled table than 
the hypercube secondary suppression method. Furthermore there was very little to 
choose in terms of percentage difference between the residual deviance from a model 
from the actual table and the residual deviance from a model from the disclosure 
controlled table between the modular method and the optimal method. Although 
there was some indication that on average the optimal method may have given 
slightly smaller percentage differences than the modular method. It must be 
remembered however that there were a limited number (20) of tables spread amongst 
all the separate forms of table and that to confirm these findings further analysis 
involving more tables would be required.
The most influential decision made by a statistician in the disclosure control process 
is whether to employ rounding or cell suppression as the disclosure control method.
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As mentioned Tau-Argus employs controlled rounding as the rounding option whilst 
there is a choice between four different secondary cell suppression techniques. It has 
already been noted that for all tables optimal secondary suppression appears on 
average to produce more efficient tables than the other secondary suppression 
methods on this data set therefore it appears sensible to compare rounding with 
optimal suppression to give an idea of which is the most efficient disclosure control 
method. The results from this study showed that controlled rounding produced tables 
with a much lower percentage difference between the residual deviance from a model 
from the actual table and the residual deviance from a model from the disclosure 
controlled table than optimal suppression. For example for 3-dimension tables with 
one variable redesigned and a minimum safe frequency of 5 the average percentage 
difference using optimal suppression was 14.38 whilst the average percentage 
difference using controlled rounding was 0.01. This difference is very large and if 
there are no mitigating circumstances the recommendation would be to use controlled 
rounding as opposed to cell suppression however, as has already been mentioned 
there are many cases where the construction of the disclosure control process is 
dependent on other variables such as the end user’s views on the aesthetics of the 
table and other such concerns. It is though interesting to note the size of the 
difference between the results collected for the two methods as this may have serious 
consequences in any disclosure control policy created by a statistical organisation.
As mentioned ISD policy currently involves using a technique called bamardisation. 
Bamardisation is a perturbative disclosure control method which adds noise (usually 
+1,0, -1) to the cell values less than five and adjusts the marginals accordingly. The 
natural method to compare with bamardisation was controlled rounding as both are
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perturbative techniques. It was found that bamardisation on average produced tables 
with a lower percentage difference between the residual deviance from a model from 
the actual table and the residual deviance from a model from the disclosure controlled 
table than controlled rounding with base five or ten and showed very similar results to 
controlled rounding with base three. This would suggest that bamardisation is a very 
efficient technique for protecting against potential disclosure although there may be 
issues with bamardisation in particular with linked tables if an intruder has auxiliary 
data they may be able to unpick a table protected by bamardisation table with greater 
ease than a table protected by controlled rounding or cell suppression. Also the 
choice between disclosure control methods may again be influenced by the needs of 
the end user.
4.6 Tabular Summary of Comparisons of Techniques on ISD Data
Table 4.6.1 provides a summary of the results of the comparisons of different 
techniques on this particular ISD data set. It must however be noted that the 
observations given in table 4.6.1 are very crude and more detailed information can be 
found in sections 4.4 and 4.5.
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Choice Made Observations
Choice of Minimum Safe 
Freqeuncy
As minimum safe frequency increased the utility of the 
protected table decreased.
Choice of Rounding Base As rounding base increased the utility of the protected 
table decreased.
Choice of Seconday 
Supression Technique (All 
Tables)
The optimal method produced protected tables with 
greater utility than the hypercube method.
Choice of Seconday 
Supression Technique 
(Hierarchical Tables)
The optimal and modular methods produced protected 
tables with similar utility and this utility was greater than 
the protected tables produced by the hypercube method.
Choice between Rounding 
and Cell Suppression
Controlled rounding produced protected tables with 
significantly greater utility than any cell suppression 
method.
Choice between Rounding 
and Bamardisation
Bamardisation produced protected tables with greater 
utility than controlled rounding with base 5 or 10 and 
similar utility to the protected tables produced by 
controlled rounding with base 3.
Table 4.6.1: Summary of comparisons of techniques on ISD data.
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5. Conclusions and Further Study
5.1 Recommendations on Statistical Disclosure Control Social Issues
Statistical disclosure control is an extremely progressive subject. Only in the 
relatively recent past have statisticians become involved in the debate and 
development of techniques to deal with the problem. This means that the thoughts on 
what is regarded as best practice are also evolving rapidly. However also evolving, at 
an extremely fast rate thanks to the exponential increase in the amount of data 
available over the World Wide Web, is the ability of potential intruders to acquire 
confidential information using the data supplied by the statistical organisation along 
with any auxiliary data they possess. Furthermore the increase in awareness of the 
ability of intruders to acquire information on subjects has led to an increase in the 
number of laws pertaining to the confidentiality of subjects. These laws are 
themselves constantly being reviewed due to the increases in technology and 
disclosure control methodology. The result of this is that statistical organisations 
must have in place effective disclosure control policy which can be adapted to both 
differing data sets and the ever changing face of statistical disclosure control 
methodology and legislation. In general the problem encountered in statistical 
disclosure control is to ensure the confidentiality of subjects in a study whilst 
retaining as much of the data utility as possible.
There are numerous social issues pertaining to the topic of statistical disclosure 
control. Firstly an important issue is defining what exactly constitutes disclosure. 
Clearly there are many ways in which a subject can be identified in a study. It may be
145
that the intruder has knowledge from auxiliary data or may for example have prior 
knowledge as to the identities of the subjects in a particular study. Furthermore it 
may be that a person has rare characteristics making them easily identifiable. If 
disclosure results from the data produced by a statistical organisation in any of the 
above scenarios it would be regarded as a failing on the part of the disclosure control 
policy of the statistical organisation. It has also been suggested that a subject being 
able to identify themselves in a study may technically be termed as disclosure from 
the data. However most organisations and laws would regard protecting against this 
level of disclosure unreasonable and would not consider this form of disclosure a 
failing on the part of the disclosure control policy.
Almost all the data given to statistical organisation is given under the promise of 
confidentiality of the subject. This is crucial since this promise encourages the 
subject to give reliable and truthful data about themselves. If the situation arises 
where the publishing of a statistical study results in disclosure of information about a 
subject, especially if this disclosure is uncovered or reported by the media, there may 
develop a lack of trust in not only the erring statistical organisation but in the 
statistical community in general. This potential lack of trust would most likely result 
in unreliable and incomplete data being provided by subjects who do not wish to risk 
any of their private information being disclosed. This issue has been brought into 
focus with the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 which came 
into force at the beginning of 2005 instructing statistical organisations to release 
information to anyone who requests it unless the request falls into one of the limited 
number of exempt circumstances. To deal with this statistical organisations must
146
have in place a stringent disclosure control policy which can be applied to all the data 
they hold.
There is an issue in statistical disclosure control that involves whether certain 
variables should be regarded as more sensitive as others and therefore be subject to 
more stringent disclosure control techniques. It is argued that different disclosure 
control techniques should be used on the data involving sensitive variables than on the 
data involving non-sensitive variables since the risk associated to the respective 
potential disclosures is different. The problem with this is that there are differing 
opinions on what data should be deemed sensitive and in fact this is often just a 
personal opinion. This leaves the statistician or their organisation in the unenviable 
position of having to make a decision on which subjects the public would deem as 
sensitive. However as a rule the statistician should err on the side of over protecting 
any information they feel may potentially cause harm or distress to the subject if 
disclosure occurred.
It is has been proposed that statistical organisations could restrict the access to the 
data to only a selected group of users. Those given access to the data would be 
required to sign a confidentiality agreement and then would be given unrestricted 
access to the raw data. This would appear to be a reasonable way of allowing access 
to complete data to those who use it for the good of society however it is believed that 
not releasing data builds up a mystique around the statistical community which may 
result in distrust. As has already been noted any lack of trust in the statistical 
community may lead to poor quality data being supplied by subjects. Furthermore it 
is believed that subjects are more likely to make an effort to take part in studies if they
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can view the results and understand how the use of their time and information has 
resulted in a collection of data that is of use to both them and society in general. For 
these reasons most statisticians believe that statistical organisations should endeavour 
to, where at all possible, release the results they collect to the general public in some 
disclosure controlled form rather than restrict access to the data.
5.2 Recommendations on Statistical Disclosure Control Methods and 
Findings
There are many statistical techniques involved in the disclosure control process. 
These techniques can be split into two categories; techniques for detecting potential 
disclosure in the data and techniques for removing potential disclosure in the data. 
Due to the nature of the data that ISD generate it was decided that this thesis would 
concentrate on the techniques used on tabular data and in particular detecting and 
removing potential disclosure in an existing table. Furthermore almost all the tables 
produced by ISD are in the form of frequency tables therefore most of the analysis in 
this thesis is produced on frequency tables. However chapter 2 gives an overview of 
techniques for detecting and removing potential disclosure in both magnitude and 
frequency tables. The techniques reviewed were on the whole standard techniques 
that have been tried and tested in statistical disclosure control processes in the past. 
Mention is also made of both the theoretical and practical rationale behind the 
techniques and the advantages and disadvantages of each method are discussed.
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There are a number of computing programs available for carrying out statistical 
disclosure control on tables. However the major package available in Europe which is 
being developed by a group working within the EU, CASC (Computational Aspects 
of Statistical Confidentiality), is Tau-Argus. The major aim of the program is to give 
the statistician the ability to carry out a number of disclosure control techniques 
without the problems caused by complex and time consuming calculations. The 
programme is evolving rapidly and the aim is to both offer more statistical techniques 
and make the program more user friendly. The techniques available in Tau-Argus to 
detect potential disclosure in tables are the minimum frequency rule, the dominance 
rule and the p% rule. Of these only the minimum frequency rule can be used to detect 
potential disclosure in a table of frequency data whilst all three techniques can be used 
to detect potential disclosure in a table of magnitude data. To remove potential 
disclosure in the tables Tau-Argus offers controlled rounding, table redesign and cell 
suppression (with four secondary suppression techniques; optimal, hypercube, 
modular, network). The experience gained from using the programme in this thesis 
suggests that it was initially difficult run the programme smoothly and some of the 
workings take time to get used to. However once one has a full understanding of how 
the programme operates it is extremely simple to carry out complex techniques on 
some large tables without any problems. Another advantage of the programme is that 
(on the tables investigated in this thesis) the techniques are carried out extremely 
quickly allowing the statistician to try a number of different disclosure control 
techniques without worrying about the issue of time consumption. However it must 
be remembered that Tau-Argus is not designed to replace the role of the statistician 
but is simply a time saving tool to aide the statistician in the disclosure control 
process. It is always prudent for the statistician to do background research and have
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an idea of potential disclosure control techniques they wish to implement before they 
start the process.
In chapter 4 an attempt was made to compare the effectiveness of various disclosure 
control techniques on a data set of interest to ISD. The data used to compare the 
various disclosure control techniques were in fact provided by ISD. It came from a 
study into diabetes in children across the whole of Scotland. Data were collected on 
365 diabetic children and 499428 control children. The variables selected were 
variables which may have had a causal effect on a child’s chances of developing 
diabetes. All the variables were categorical therefore all the tables contain frequency 
data. It was decided to carry out disclosure control on both 2 and 3 dimensional 
tables although it would have been possible to carry out the disclosure control 
procedure on tables with higher dimensions. The data provided produced three tables 
of 2 dimensions and six tables of 3 dimensions which contained cells with a risk of 
potential disclosure. Since all the tables were made up from variables which had 
categories which could be collapsed into larger categories it was decided to carry out 
redesign on all the tables and follow the redesign of the table with further disclosure 
control methods if necessary. This provided an opportunity to consider how 
redesigning the table would affect both further analysis and the role of the further 
disclosure control techniques.
The statistical disclosure control procedure was carried out using Tau-Argus. The 
aim was to compare the effect of different disclosure control methods on the 
information lost in the table when each method was applied to the table. Before 
proceeding with the comparisons it was important to have a technique to quantify the
150
loss of information. Tau-Argus provides a tool for quantifying information loss but 
this was not used since the technique was different for the different methods used for 
removing potential disclosure in the table. To allow a comparison to be made 
between different disclosure control methods requires a technique which is constant 
for all methods. The technique used to allow these comparisons was based on 
constructing a log linear model for both the actual and disclosure tables and 
comparing the residual deviances.
There are many choices available to the statistician in the disclosure control process. 
These choices often have a large bearing on the final outcome of the table and 
therefore all options should be thoroughly considered before any disclosure control 
procedure is confirmed. The choices investigated in this thesis were:
1. Choice of minimum safe frequency
2. Choice of rounding base
3. Choice of cell suppression method (across all tables)
4. Choice of cell suppression method (across tables containing a hierarchical 
variable)
5. Choice of controlled rounding ox cell suppression
6. Choice of bamardisation or controlled rounding
The findings are summarised in the remainder of this section.
Three different minimum safe frequencies (3,5 and 10) were compared. As expected 
as the minimum safe frequency was increased the percentage difference between the
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residual deviance from a model of the actual table and the residual deviance from a 
model of the disclosure controlled table increased implying that the table was less 
useful in further analysis when the minimum safe frequency was larger. This is 
unsurprising since as the minimum frequency increased the number of cells below the 
minimum safe frequency will have increased. Clearly the choice of the minimum safe 
frequency is initially determined by how large the statistician feels the cell should be 
to ensure there is a small enough risk of potential disclosure, however these results 
show that the statistician should endeavour to keep the minimum safe frequency as 
low as possible.
Controlled rounding is the only rounding option offered by Tau-Argus. This causes 
no problem since it is generally accepted that controlled rounding is the most efficient 
rounding technique. Three different rounding bases were compared (3,5 and 10). As 
expected as the rounding base was increased the percentage difference between the 
residual deviance from a model of the actual table and the residual deviance from a 
model of the disclosure controlled table increased implying that the table was less 
useful in further analysis when the rounding base was larger. This is unsurprising 
since when the rounding base is increased there is a chance that the rounded cell value 
will be further away from the actual value than when a smaller rounding base is used. 
As with the minimum frequency it is clear that the rounding base should be kept as 
low as possible whilst providing adequate protection against potential disclosure.
Of the four secondary suppression techniques available in Tau-Argus only two 
(optimal suppression and hypercube suppression) were applicable to all the tables in 
this study. Of these two techniques it appeared that the optimal secondary
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suppression method gave a lower percentage difference between the residual deviance 
from a model of the actual table and the residual deviance from a model of the 
disclosure controlled table than the hypercube secondary suppression method over all 
the tables and that the difference appeared to be larger for 3-dimension tables than 2- 
dimension tables. This was not a surprising result but in some cases the optimal 
method required two or three minutes longer to mn than the hypercube method. 
Clearly this length of time is no problem but if the table became more complex there 
may become issues with time constraints. However if the statistician has the time and 
computing power to carry out an optimal secondary suppression procedure they 
should endeavour to do so.
The modular secondary suppression method is a technique used to deal with the 
secondary suppression problem in hierarchical tables. It was of interest to compare 
the modular method with the two universal secondary suppression techniques, 
(optimal suppression and hypercube suppression) when protecting against potential 
disclosure in hierarchical tables. It appeared that both the modular suppression 
method and the optimal suppression method in general gave a lower percentage 
difference between the residual deviance from a model of the actual table and the 
residual deviance from a model of the disclosure controlled table than the hypercube 
secondary suppression method whilst there was very little to choose in terms of 
percentage difference between the residual deviance from a model of the actual table 
and the residual deviance from a model of the disclosure controlled table between the 
modular method and the optimal method. There was some indication that the optimal 
suppression technique gave slightly smaller percentage differences than the modular 
suppression technique however there were only 20 tables and the difference in results
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from each method was small. It would appear from these results that the modular 
secondary suppression technique offers little advantage to using the optimal 
suppression technique. If there are hierarchical variables with more hierarchies or 
categories the modular suppression method may prove more efficient.
The choice between either controlled rounding or cell suppression is the most 
influential made in the options given by Tau-Argus since the decision has a large 
bearing on the final appearance of the table. The comparison made in chapter 4.4 was 
between controlled rounding and cell suppression with optimal secondary suppression 
used since it has been shown to be more (or at least equivalently) efficient to the other 
secondary suppression methods in all the cases. It was shown that controlled 
rounding produced tables with a much lower percentage difference between the 
residual deviance from a model of the actual table and the residual deviance from a 
model of the disclosure controlled table than optimal suppression. The difference 
between the efficiency of the two methods was so large that the statistician should if 
possible use controlled rounding as opposed to cell suppression however, there are 
often other circumstances (such as an end users view on the aesthetics of the table) 
which may lead to the statistician rejecting the controlled rounding option.
ISD policy currently employs a technique known as bamardisation. Bamardisation is 
a perturbative technique for removing potential disclosure in a table. Since the 
technique is perturbative it is sensible to compare this to controlled rounding. It was 
found that bamardisation on average produced tables with a lower percentage 
difference between the residual deviance from a model of the actual table and the 
residual deviance from a model of the disclosure controlled table than controlled
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rounding with base five or ten and showed very similar results to controlled rounding 
with base three. This would suggest that bamardisation is an effective technique for 
removing potential disclosure in tables. However doubts have been raised as to the 
effectiveness of bamardisation with regards to protecting data in linked tables and 
whether the protection offered is sufficient.
From the techniques available in Tau-Argus it would appear that on this data set the 
tables produced were most efficient in further analysis when the minimum frequency 
mle with a minimum safe frequency of three was the technique used to detect 
potential disclosure in the table and controlled rounding with a rounding base of three 
was the technique used to remove potential disclosure from the table. Using this 
technique would potentially open the issue of whether three is a large enough 
minimum safe frequency but in this situation when the nature of the data (i.e. diabetes 
not being an extra ‘sensitive’ issue) is considered it is probably fair to say that as long 
as each cell has three subjects the table has a low enough disclosure risk to publish. 
Clearly this decision will be made on each case individually and the responsibility 
will lie with the statistician. It is important to remember that the utility, although 
extremely, important is not the only issue that governs the required disclosure control 
technique. It is the responsibility of the statistician to have a dialog with the end user 
of the table (or if the end user is the general public the statistician must consider what 
the wishes of the general public would be) to determine what they require from the 
published table and attempt to construct a disclosure process that allows these 
requirements to be met.
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5.3 Potential for Further Study
This thesis has given a general overview of statistical methods used to prevent 
potential disclosure in tabular data. The theory behind and the practicalities of a 
number of disclosure control techniques have been investigated fully and many of 
these techniques have been investigated in practical application. The thesis has 
attempted to give a broad overview of various techniques and applications however 
there are certain areas in which the work can potentially be furthered.
Due to both the nature of the data and time constraints it was only possible to carry 
out the disclosure control process on a limited number of tables from a single data set. 
It would be prudent to carry out disclosure control on tables produced from different 
sets of data. This would both allow more confidence in the results produced and 
ensure that the trends found in this data set in terms of effectiveness of the various 
disclosure control techniques are the same as the trends found in other data sets. This 
may also give a greater insight into the different occasions in which certain disclosure 
control methods are more efficient. Furthermore it may be interesting to investigate 
the efficiency of the different disclosure control techniques when linked tables are 
present. Two tables are linked if they have at least one common explanatory variable 
and the variable which gives the cell values (e.g. frequency) is common. Linked 
tables create a whole new dimension for the problem of disclosure control and the 
process of protecting linked tables against potential disclosure offers further 
challenges. Tau-Argus does in fact give the option to the user to protect linked tables 
against potential disclosure and an investigation into this option would be of interest.
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This thesis has concentrated on the statistical disclosure control methods with 
particular application to healthcare (and in particular ISD) scenarios. This resulted in 
the comparisons of the different disclosure control methods being carried out on real 
ISD data. These data were of the type usually released by ISD meaning that the data 
used to carry out the comparisons was solely frequency data. Many of the disclosure 
control techniques, in particular those used to detect potential disclosure, are only 
applicable when the table contains magnitude data. It would be interesting to make 
similar comparisons, as done in chapter 4, but using magnitude data allowing different 
techniques for detecting potential disclosure to be investigated. It would also be 
interesting to investigate how the efficiency of the different techniques used for 
removing potential disclosure differed when the table consisted of magnitude data 
rather than frequency data.
In this thesis it was decided to use the percentage difference between the residual 
deviance from a log linear model of the actual table and the residual deviance from a 
log linear model of the disclosure controlled table to investigate the efficiency of the 
tables produced using each disclosure control method. The reason that this measure 
was chosen was that it gave a means to investigate each disclosure control process 
using the same measurement. There are countless other ways in which the efficiency 
of the table could have been measured although I believe that the measurement should 
be associated with the effect the disclosure control method has on the ability of 
someone not involved in process to carry out reasonable further analysis on the table 
and produce results similar to those for the actual table. It would be interesting if the 
conclusions drawn about the efficiency of each method were the same had the 
efficiency been measured in a different but still sensible way.
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Since ISD in general carry out the disclosure process after the tables have been 
produced this thesis has concentrated on the techniques associated with this form of 
disclosure control. There are also techniques used to prevent potential disclosure by 
adjusting the microdata before the tables have been produced. This form of disclosure 
control includes the use of techniques such as global recoding, local suppression and 
the post randomisation method. These techniques are very different in theory from 
the techniques used to protect the table after it has been produced. This may result in 
large differences in the disclosure controlled tables produced. Mu-Argus, a package 
produced by the CASC project alongside Tau-Argus, allows these methods to be 
carried out in a simple computing package. It would be interesting to investigate the 
effects of using the methods available in Mu-Argus on the disclosure controlled table 
and comparing the efficiency of the various disclosure control methods available in 
both Tau-Argus and Mu-Argus.
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